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ABSTRACT 
The frequency of dissenting opinions accompanying arbitration 
awards in international arbitration has multiplied, particularly in 
international investment arbitration. Accordingly, dissenting opinions 
are now inevitable companions to majority awards. Notwithstanding 
the fact that dissenting opinions neither form part of an arbitral 
award nor constitute a separate award, the escalation of dissenting 
opinions spawns anxiety in scholars and practitioners. This 
trepidation ignited a crusade whereby those opposed to the practice 
of rendering dissent challenge the role and usefulness of these 
opinions. In this respect, this Article initially considers and critiques 
specific arguments raised by those opposed to dissenting opinions in 
international arbitration. Following analysis of the criticisms, this 
Article explores the beneficial and constructive aspects of dissenting 
opinions. Evident from this discussion is that dissenting opinions are 
not only integral to supplement an arbitrator’s quasi-judicial 
capacity, but also encourage issuance of well-reasoned awards. Clear 
from the benefits of dissenting opinions in international arbitration, 
any departure from the present clemency espoused toward the 
practice will eventuate in the field’s regression. 
INTRODUCTION 
ne distinctive aspect of international arbitration is the autonomy 
vested within the arbitrating parties with regard to structuring 
arbitral procedure. By virtue of this party autonomy, the parties and 
arbitrators are entitled to dispense with redundant formalities and 
procedures of litigation and instead fashion procedures altered in 
accord with their particular needs and disputes.1 This party autonomy 
is central to the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. The overriding 
principle espoused by major international arbitration conventions and 
national arbitration statutes is to give effect to the parties’ covenant 
with respect to the selection of arbitrators. This principle further 
1 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 85 (Wolters Kluwer Law 
& Business 2d ed. 2014). 
O 
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applies to contracts regarding the number of arbitrators.2 For instance, 
Article 10(1) of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law states that “the parties are free 
to determine the number of arbitrators.”3 In harmony with this 
provision, Article 1(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that 
“unless such information is provided in the request, the parties shall 
communicate to the Secretary-General as soon as possible any 
provisions agreed by them regarding the number of arbitrators. . . . ”4 
Because arbitration provides parties with carte blanche to choose 
the desired number of arbitrators, parties may opt to submit their 
dispute to a sole arbitrator.5 Despite the advantages affiliated with a 
sole arbitrator, the modern trend in international arbitration is to refer 
disputes to three-member arbitral tribunals, which are comprised of 
diverse cultural, economic, legal, and linguistic backgrounds. Thus, 
when an arbitral tribunal is composed of more than one arbitrator, the 
resolution of a Daedalian dispute may be preceded by the arduous 
task of harmonizing the tribunal members’ opinions. Failure to 
harmonize will obviously result in tribunal divergence. 
Today, perhaps as a result of the important role dissenting opinions 
play in the development of law within the ambit of national and 
2 See English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 15(1); Turkish International Arbitration 
Law 4686, Official Gazette No. 24453, art. 7 (enacted July 5, 2001), http://www.camera-
arbitrale.it/Documenti/tial_turkey.pdf; SWISS FEDERAL CODE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW [CPIL] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 179; Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 
[SFS] § 12 (1999:116). As to the institutional rules, see also Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce [SCC], Arbitration Rules, art. 16(1) (Jan. 1, 2017) 
[hereinafter SCC Arbitration Rules]; International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], 
Arbitration Rules, art. 12(2) (Mar. 1, 2017) [herein after ICC Arbitration Rules]; Istanbul 
Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules, art. 13; Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
[HKIAC], Administered Arbitration Rules, art. 6(1) (Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter HKIAC 
Arbitration Rules]; China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
[CIETAC], Arbitration Rules, art. 25 (May 1, 2012) [hereinafter CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules]. 
3 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 10(1) (1985) (UNCITRAL 
amended 2006). 
4 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], Arbitration 
Rules, arts. 1(2), 2(1) and 37(2)(b) (1985) (ICSID amended 2006) [hereinafter ICSID 
Arbitration Rules].  
5 BORN, supra note 1, at 1669. “One arbitrator is easier, in some respects, to select than 
a larger number of arbitrators, while he or she generally costs less and can act more 
quickly than multiple arbitrators. . . . Parties sometimes find these various advantages 
decisive and opt for a sole arbitrator; that is particularly true in smaller cases or in some 
industrial sectors. Thus, in roughly 40% of ICC arbitrations, the parties’ arbitration 
agreement provides for a sole arbitrator.” 
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international litigation, the permissibility of dissent in arbitration is 
well accepted.6 Per Alan Redfern, “At present, a generally relaxed 
attitude toward dissenting opinions seems to be taken not only by the 
arbitral institutions, but also by the arbitrators themselves . . .”7 This 
relaxed approach instigated an increase in arbitral dissents, 
particularly in investment arbitration.8 Unsurprisingly, this escalation 
birthed extensive “inquir[y] [into] whether the present leniency 
toward dissenting opinions . . . ha[d] gone too far.”9 Hence, within the 
context of international arbitration, there are valid reasons to question 
the benefits of dissenting opinions and whether the advantages of 
these opinions outweigh the notable downsides.10 
Written in the midst of this dilemma, this Article first delves into a 
brief history of the doctrine of dissent in litigation and international 
arbitration. Using examples from civil and common law cases, this 
Article will illustrate that the issuance of dissent and acceptance of 
dissenting opinions advances both domestic and international law. 
However, also evident from this discussion is the adversity dissenting 
opinions face from critics. These critics find that dissenting opinions 
not only threaten judgment and award authority, but also erode the 
prestige and power of the court and arbitral tribunal. These criticisms, 
however, must be taken with a grain of salt. This Article will show 
that, rather than encouraging the erosion of law, dissenting opinions 
provide a necessary function in developing law domestically and 
internationally. 
Second, in light of the relevant contributions of dissenting opinions 
in domestic and international litigation, this Article delves into the 
costs and benefits of dissent within the context of international 
arbitration. This discussion initially and briefly explores the 
differences between litigation and arbitration and then proceeds into 
the disadvantages of dissent according to critics as well as the 
undeniable advantages of dissenting opinions in international 
6 See R.P. Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International 
Adjudication, 14 THE INT’L & COMP. LAW Q. 788–808 (1965). 
7 Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields—Lecture Dissenting Opinions in International 
Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT’L 223, 242 (2004). 
8 Albert Jan van den Berg, Charles Brower’s Problem with 100%—Dissenting 
Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L 381, 
384 (2015). 
9 Redfern, supra note 7, at 242. 
10 Peter J. Rees QC & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can They Fulfill a 
Beneficial Role?, 25 ARB. INT’L 329, 330–31 (2009). 
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arbitration. From this discussion, this Article concludes that, in light 
of an arbitrator’s quasi-judicial role, the practice of dissenting opinion 
is not only necessary but also integral to both the arbitral process’s 
dynamism and the reign of the party autonomy, and an essential 
constituent of arbitral tribunals’ duty to render a well-reasoned, 
substantiated award.  
I 
DISSENTING OPINIONS IN LITIGATION 
A. Civil Law
Numerous arbitration practitioners and scholars perceive the arrival 
of dissenting opinions in international arbitration as an unwelcome 
gift of Anglo-American common law doctrine and practices.11 The 
inspiration behind dissenting opinions emanates from the practice of 
the English House of Lords, whereby judges gave individual speeches 
concerning their opinions.12 Notably, in civil law jurisdictions, 
emphasis is traditionally placed upon preserving deliberation secrecy 
as well as collegiality in delivering justice (purportedly to nurture the 
public’s perception of the law as a dependable and secure system).13 
Resultantly, in a select number of these jurisdictions, dissenting 
opinions are not favored or even allowed.14 However, this 
11 Redfern, supra note 7, at 225 (“Dissenting opinions have come to international 
commercial arbitration as a gift of the common law.”). See also Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & 
Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in Investment Arbitration, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 445, 450–58 (2012); Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions By Party-
Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 822 (Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011). 
12 Van den Berg, supra note 11. See also Ruth Breeze, Dissenting and Concurring 
Opinions in International Investment Arbitration: How the Arbitrators Frame Their Need 
to Differ, 25 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 393, 395 (2012). 
13 Van den Berg, supra note 11; Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting 
Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010); Redfern, supra note 7, at 225 (“There is no 
tradition of dissenting opinions in the civil law. It was thought that a court’s decision 
should appear as the decision of the court as a whole, rather than as a mathematical 
process by which one party emerged as the winner, having gained more votes than his or 
her adversary. Dissenting opinions have come to international commercial arbitration as a 
gift of the common law. Many rejoice at the way in which different legal procedures and 
traditions are mixed together to build what Sir Michael Kerr called ‘the emerging common 
procedural pattern in international arbitration.’ It is doubtful, however, whether the 
dissenting opinion has added much, if anything, of the value to the arbitral process.”). 
14 This approach, however, no longer suits reality. Today, many civil law countries 
grant their judges the right to issue dissenting opinions. Nonetheless, there are some civil 
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antagonistic approach toward dissenting opinions in civil law 
countries is eroding. For example, historically, German courts strictly 
executed the rule necessitating deliberation secrecy, and thus, 
divergence in opinion was never revealed.15 Conversely, today the 
German Constitutional Court exercises a different approach and 
grants its judges freedom of choice in whether to issue dissenting 
opinions.16  
B. Common Law
Publicly declaring and articulating dissenting opinions is 
theoretically premised upon common law tradition.17 Under the 
common law system, judges construe written law and develop new 
law within the context of precedents, statutes, and well-recognized 
principles.18 This formation of law, however, cannot be considered 
independent from dissenting opinions. Although future judges are not 
bound by dissenting opinions, law is a system subject to continual 
change. Dissenting opinions, by acting as persuasive authority, often 
affect law’s advancements.19 The influence of dissenting opinions 
over the advancement of law may be found in the oft-repeated words 
of Chief Justice Evans Hughes of the United States Supreme Court. 
Per Chief Justice Hughes, “A dissent in a court of last resort is an 
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future 
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which 
the dissenting judge believes the Court have been betrayed.”20  
law countries that resist allowing judges to publish dissenting opinions. These countries 
include France, Italy, and the Netherlands. For further information regarding dissenting 
opinion practice of the European Union member states, see Rosa Raffaelli, Dissenting 
Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Member States, PE 462.470, POLICY DEP’T. C. 
CITIZENS’ RIGHTS & CONST. AFFAIRS (Nov. 2012), http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130423ATT64963/20130423ATT64963EN.
pdf. 
15 Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 
415, 415 (1959) (“The Rule of Law as Understood in the West’ was considered at a round-
table held by the International Association of Legal Science in Chicago in September, 
1957. In the course of the discussion, a German participant, member of the German 
Constitutional Court, who had referred to a decision of his court, was asked what the vote 
had been in the case. His answer was a reference to a rule in German law requiring judges 
to keep the deliberation secret.”). 
16 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 822 n.7. 
17 Breeze, supra note 12, at 395. 
18 Id. 
19 Anand, supra note 6, at 793; Breeze, supra note 12, at 395–96. 
20 Anand, supra note 6, at 793. 
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Indeed, American jurisprudence exemplifies how dissenting 
opinions appeal to “the intelligence of a future day” and influences 
the progression of the law.21 To illustrate, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
Justice Harlan diverged from the majority’s finding that racial 
segregation survived constitutional muster under the “separate but 
equal doctrine.” In his dissent, he propounded:  
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows or
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.22
Years after Plessy, Justice Harlan’s dissent maintained its potency. 
It laid the intellectual foundation for the judgment furnished in Brown 
v. Board of Education,23 where the Court ended racial segregation in
schools. In addition to Justice Harlan, Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., also showed unwavering support for the use of
dissent to transform law. In Abrams v. United States and Lochner v.
New York, Justice Holmes’s dissents restructured the law on free
speech, and also established the basis for modern-day economic
regulations.24
Next, in consonance with American jurisprudence, English courts 
(similarly established under common law) often propound that 
dissenting opinions contribute to the development and acclimatization 
21 Id. 
22 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
23 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24 Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Dissenting Opinions in International 
Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT BROMS 259, 261 (1999); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized that 
time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.”); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State 
or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident 
of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not 
to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict 
with the Constitution of the United States.”). (For further information regarding Justice 
Holmes’ dissenting opinion in the Lochner case, see Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of 
Contract and the “Political Economy” of Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
515–69 (2005)). 
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of law. For instance, Lord Mustill’s dissent in the Ken Ren case25 
successfully epitomizes English favoritism for dissent. In Ken Ren, 
the contractor Coppée-Lavalin lodged requests with the High Court 
per Section 12(6)(a) of the Arbitration Act of 1950 to acquire an order 
for security for their costs in an ICC arbitration held in London.26 The 
issue went up to the House of Lords. The conundrum confronting 
their Lordships was whether jurisdiction vested with the English court 
to permit such an order. The majority of Lord Justices agreed that 
there was a discretionary power conferred upon the court to issue an 
order for security for costs in the arbitration.27 However, Lord Mustill 
and Lord Browne-Wilkinson deviated from the majority and 
furnished a dissenting opinion. In his dissent, Lord Mustill stated: 
The fact remains however that an uncorrectable miscarriage of 
justice is something which parties risk by agreeing to entrust their 
disputes to a private dispute-resolution system. . . . The parties 
choose arbitration for better or for worse. They relish the better 
features, of which there are many. When things take a turn for the 
worse, there are limits beyond which they cannot be allowed, 
consistently with their arbitration agreement, to run to the courts for 
help. . . .[A]n order for security for costs does not conform with the 
type of procedure which the parties have impliedly chosen, and that 
an order for security should be refused notwithstanding that on a 
narrower view it appears to answer the justice of the case.28 
Reflecting the potential impact of dissenting opinions, just one year 
after Ken Ren, the English Arbitration Act of 1996 mirrored Lord 
Mustill’s approach and confiscated from the English courts the 
authority to order security for costs in arbitration; the Act instead 
conferred this authority upon arbitrators.29  
Recognition of dissent as a customary means of judicial expression 
in both common and civil law jurisdictions eventuated in integrating 
the practice of dissenting opinion into international adjudication. 
Today, the issuance of dissenting opinions is widely accepted by 
international courts and other bodies performing quasi-judicial roles.30 
25 S.A. Coppée Lavalin N.V. v. Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers [1995] 1 AC 38 
(HL) (appeal taken from England). 
26 Id. 
27 Redfern, supra note 7, at 231. 
28 S.A. Coppée Lavalin N.V. v. Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers [1995] 1 AC 65 
(HL) (appeal taken from England). 
29 English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, §§ 38–44, sch.1. Where section 38 regulates the 
arbitral tribunal’s general powers, section 44 dictates the judiciary’s power in support of 
arbitral proceedings. 
30 Fraga & Samra, supra note 11, at 456. 
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For example, both the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(hereinafter PCIJ)31 and its successor, the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter ICJ), embrace dissenting opinions. Article 57 of 
the Statute of the ICJ provides, “If the judgment does not represent in 
whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall 
be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.” 
Unsurprisingly, similar to American and English jurisprudence, 
dissenting opinions furnished in the ICJ also play a pivotal role in 
improving and modifying international law.32 To aid in the cultivation 
of international law—because the issues tackled by the ICJ are often 
unsettled and these proceedings are public—dissenting opinions 
readily find voice and influence in subsequent litigation.33 To 
illustrate, disunity among the members of the PCIJ in the Lotus case34 
exemplified international law’s deficiencies in regulating the 
extension of national liability to crimes perpetrated on the high seas.35 
From this disunity arose dissent that not only alleviated this 
deficiency, but also contributed to the development of law.36  
In addition to the ICJ, the following international courts and 
tribunals endorse dissenting opinions: (1) ICSID; (2) the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal; (3) the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea; (4) the International Criminal Court; (5) the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone; (6) the Special Court for Lebanon; (7) the Inter-
31 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 822 n.6 (“The final version of the Statute [of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice] provided: ‘If the judgment does not represent in 
whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to 
deliver a separate opinion.’”). 
32 See Anand, supra note 6. 
33 Domenico Di Pietro, The Controversial Role of Dissenting Opinions in International 
Arbitral Awards, TRANSNATIONAL NOTES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/ 
transnational/2011/10/the-controversial-role-of-dissenting-opinions-in-international-
arbitral-awards/. 
34 Anand, supra note 6, at 803. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 803–04 (“It also seems, to take another example at random, that Judge 
Lauterpacht’s strong individual and dissenting opinions in the Norwegian Loans and 
Interhandel cases respectively, denouncing the “automatic” reservations in the 
declarations accepting the International Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, have had a 
marked effect on the attitudes of governments. These two cogent pieces of reasoning not 
only seem to have stopped the trend of including such reservations in new declarations, but 
have persuaded several states (France, India, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan) to 
abandon them from their declarations in which they had been included.”). 
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American Court of Human Rights; and (8) the European Court of 
Human Rights.37 
Notwithstanding this apparent widespread adoption and use of 
dissent in both national and international jurisprudence, these 
opinions remain denunciated.38 The principal argument against 
dissenting opinions is premised upon the need to safeguard a 
judgment’s authority as well as the authority of the furnishing court.39 
Pursuant to this argument, because dissenting opinions manifest 
dissonance, not only is the judgment’s authority undermined, but also 
the losing party is heartened to question the judgment’s validity and 
attempt appeal, where possible. In support of this concern, Judge 
Learned Hand of the United States Federal Court of Appeals opined 
that “disunity cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the 
authority of a bench of judges largely depends.”40 In furtherance of 
Judge Hand’s remarks regarding the connection of dissenting 
opinions and judgment authority, Manley O. Hudson (a former 
37 Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed 
Nightingale: Why the Paulsson–van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed 
Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7, 28 (2013). See also 
Fraga & Samra, supra note 11, at 456. Some of the articles regulating the practice of 
dissenting opinion in the context of the cited international courts and tribunals are as 
follows: ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, art. 48(4) (Apr. 15, 2006) (“Any member of the 
Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the 
majority or not, or a statement of his dissent.”); ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at 
art. 47(3) (“Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award, 
whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent.”); Tribunal 
Rules of Procedure, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, art. 
32(3) (May 3, 1983) (“Any arbitrator may request that his dissenting vote or his dissenting 
vote and the reasons therefore be recorded.”); Article 65(2) of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (“Any Judge who has taken part in the consideration of a case is entitled to 
append a separate reasoned opinion to the judgment, concurring or dissenting.”); European 
Convention on Human Rights, EUR. CT. H.R. & COUNCIL OF EUR., art. 45(2) (June 1, 
2010) (“If a judgment does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the 
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.”); Rules of Court, EUR. 
CT. H.R., ch. VIII, r. 74, § 2 (Aug. 1, 2018) (“Any judge who has taken part in the 
consideration of the case by a Chamber or by the Grand Chamber shall be entitled to 
annex to the judgment either a separate opinion, concurring with or dissenting from that 
judgment, or a bare statement of dissent.”). 
38 See Anand, supra note 6. 
39 See Redfern, supra note 7; Anand, supra note 6. Other arguments raised against 
dissenting opinions include: dissenting opinions may generate redundant ambiguity and 
confusion in the public, dissenting opinions may undermine the collegial relationship 
among judges, and dissenting opinions may considerably slow down the process of 
judicial deliberations and proliferate judicial expenses. 
40 Anand, supra note 6, at 791. 
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member of the PCIJ) alluded to the insidious impact of dissent, stating 
that “disastrous consequences might follow for a high judicial 
institution which can command observance of its judgment and 
opinions only by its prestige and by the persuasion which the 
statement of its conclusions imparts.”41 
Based on the foregoing, skeptics argue that dissenting opinions 
represent a menace to the authority of judgments and to the prestige 
of the courts. Notwithstanding the cogency of these arguments, it is 
neither promising nor appropriate to perceive unanimity as an 
exclusive source from which the authority of judgments and the 
prestige of the courts derive. Discouraging dissent for the sake of 
unanimity will merely apportion delusional dependability and regard 
to both the judgments and rendering courts. Rather, a well-written and 
sincere dissent should take precedence because these dissents may, 
and often do, enhance the quality of the ultimate judgment, and 
accordingly give birth “not only [to] authoritarian but also [to] 
authoritative”42 judgments.  
In sum, far from eroding judgment, authority, and court reputation, 
dissenting opinions conveyed in national and international judicial 
proceedings “add to their vitality, comprehension, and usefulness,”43 
while simultaneously contributing to the development and innovation 
of dynamic national and international law. Although this conclusion 
appears evident, the same deduction may not come so easily when the 
issue comes to the role of dissenting opinions in international 
arbitration. Because of the evident differences in principles and 
priority existing between litigation and international arbitration, it is 
appropriate to now analyze why concern of dissenting opinions is 
minimal in one forum, but give rise to grave unease in another. 
II 
DISSENTING OPINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
To begin the discussion of dissenting opinions and their import in 
international arbitration, it is helpful to note initial differences 
between litigation and arbitration. Whereas litigation, national and 
international, largely appears before judges, arbitration occurs before 
41 Manley O. Hudson, The Twenty-Eighth Year of the World Court, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 21 (1950). 
42 Raffaelli, supra note 14, at 13. 
43 Anand, supra note at 6, at 794. 
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arbitrators and is controlled by a party-made contract. Specifically, in 
international arbitration disputes are commonly referred to a tribunal 
of multiple arbitrators. Once appointed, the tribunal’s implied duty (to 
render a unanimous award) is usually unforgiving. However, although 
the expectation of a unanimous award is held by the arbitrating 
parties, ironically, by the very nature of international arbitration and 
party autonomy, this expectation is often defeated. Because party 
autonomy allots the parties the privilege to nominate or appoint 
arbitrators with specific substantive, cultural, or legal experience, a 
tribunal comprised of multiple arbitrators is bound to disagree. 
Unsurprisingly, especially in international disputes, a tribunal of 
multiple arbitrators results in a panel of great diversity in national, 
legal, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds.44 This diversity carries 
with it a concomitant risk of bifurcation among the tribunal members. 
This divergence may result from differences of opinion regarding the 
outcome of the dispute (and its reasoning) or simply upon particular 
facets of the dispute (such as arbitral costs).45 Thus, when a split 
occurs, the question changes to whether an arbitrator holding the 
minority opinion should fight out the differences behind closed doors 
and eventually acquiesce to the majority or whether the arbitrator 
should vocalize the reasons leading to divergence via a dissenting 
opinion. In response to this question, practitioners and scholars today 
diverge, and this discrepancy reflects the polarity that perpetually 
plagues the field. 
To address the divergence of opinion between scholars and 
practitioners, in 1985 the International Chamber of Commerce 
Commission on International Arbitration assembled a Working Party 
on Dissenting Opinions on Interim and Partial Arbitral Awards 
(Working Party) to tackle the issue.46 After the deliberations and the 
opinions garnered from invited commentary, the Working Party 
released its final report and concluded: 
It is neither practical nor desirable to attempt to suppress dissenting 
opinions in ICC arbitrations. A minority opinion was expressed to 
the effect that the ICC should seek to minimize the role of 
44 BORN, supra note 1, at 1669 (saying “permits a mix of arbitrators with diverse 
national, legal, and linguistic backgrounds.”); see also BORN, supra note 1, at 1782–83. 
45 Christoph Stippl & Veit Öhlberger, Rendering of the Award by Multipartite Arbitral 
Tribunals: How to Overcome Lack of Unanimity, 2008 AUSTRIAN ARB. Y.B. 371, 385 
(2008). 
46 Ilhyung Lee, Introducing International Commercial Arbitration and Its Lawlessness, 
By Way of the Dissenting Opinion, 4 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 19, 24 (2011). 
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dissenting opinions, but the prevailing view was that the ICC should 
neither encourage nor discourage the giving of such opinions.47 
With this conclusion, the Working Party concurrently said 
“something” and “nothing” on the controversial position of dissenting 
opinions in international arbitration. Consequently, arbitration 
practitioners and scholars have since weighed in on the debate.48 On 
one end of the spectrum, conservatives regard dissenting opinions as a 
breach of the essence of international arbitration and, accordingly, 
severely disapprove of them, particularly in the context of commercial 
arbitration.49 However, on the other end, there are pragmatists who 
purportedly assess the advantages and disadvantages of dissenting 
opinions prior to coming to a conclusion concerning their value.50 
To tip the scales in favor of one argument or the other, it is 
essential to examine the legal framework regulating dissenting 
opinions in international arbitration and intellectualize the alleged 
advantages and disadvantages of dissent in international arbitration.  
A. Legal Framework Regulating Dissenting Opinions in
International Arbitration 
International arbitration is a hybrid of common law and civil law 
traditions.51 Resultantly, most national arbitration laws and 
institutional arbitration rules fail to provide guidance on the subject of 
dissenting opinions.52 Further, in practice, arbitration agreements 
rarely incorporate rules on conveying dissenting opinions. This lack 
of regulation generates obscurity regarding issuance, publication, and 
communication of dissenting opinions, leaving the issue to be 
determined by arbitral majority, upon whom wide discretion is 
conferred.  
47 Di Pietro, supra note 33. 
48 Lee, supra note 46. 
49 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 329–30 (“Although the admissibility of dissenting 
opinions seems to be now widely recognized and arbitral institutions appear to take a more 
relaxed attitude toward dissenting opinions, they still seem to be frowned upon by some 
practitioners and the prevailing view is that they should be discouraged.”). As to the 
arbitration practitioners and scholars who oppose dissenting opinions, see Rees & Rohn, 
supra note 10, at 330 n.3. 
50 Lee, supra note 46, at 25. 
51 Catherine M. Amirfar, Chapter 8: Oral Proceedings, in LITIGATING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION DISPUTES 232, 233 (2014). 
52 BORN, supra note 1, at 3054. 
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However, although guidance relating to dissent is often limited, 
there are some national arbitration statutes and institutional arbitration 
rules where dissenting opinions are unambiguously addressed. For 
example, the following represents a list of select national arbitration 
statutes where rules regarding dissenting opinions are dictated:  
1. Article 14A(4) of the Turkish International Arbitration Law,
which permits arbitrators to specify how they voted in the
arbitral award and, in practice, allows dissenting opinions to
either be attached to or be dictated in the award;
2. Article 53 of the Chinese Arbitration Law, which states that
the opinion of the minority arbitrator may be entered into
record;
3. Article 24(2) of the Brazilian Arbitration Law provides that a
dissenting arbitrator may render a separate opinion;
4. Article 39(1) of the Bulgarian Arbitration Law provides that an
arbitrator who disagrees with the award shall state his/her
dissenting opinion in writing;
5. Section 32(4) of the Slovakian Arbitration Act permits the
“outvoted” arbitrator to attach his/her dissenting opinion to the
arbitral award and provide reasons for the dissent; and last,
6. Article 37(3) of the Spanish Arbitration Act allows arbitrators
to specify how they voted and, further, if any arbitrator omits
his or her signature from the arbitral award, he or she is
required to provide reasoning for the omission.53
1. English Approach
Interestingly, the English Arbitration of Act of 1996 (hereinafter
the English Arbitration Act) espouses no incorporated rule regarding 
dissenting opinions. This silence may be perceived as an echo of the 
comprehensive autonomy bestowed upon the parties. Demonstrably, 
in the spirit of this autonomy, Section 52(1) of the English Arbitration 
Act permits parties to agree on the form of the award, and absent such 
agreement, default rules apply.54 These default rules dictate that, in 
the absence of an agreement, pursuant to Section 52(3) of the English 
53 Declining to sign an arbitral award is one mechanism to show disagreement. The 
dissenting arbitrator may also deliver a written dissenting opinion articulating the reasons 
for dissent. This is sometimes delivered in the form of a dissenting or separate 
statement/opinion, often annexed to the arbitral award. For further details, see BORN, 
supra note 1, at 3053. 
54 English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 52(1). 
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Arbitration Act, “the award shall be in writing signed by all the 
arbitrators or all those assenting to the award.”55 Summarily, if an 
arbitrator wishes to dissent, per the language of the Act, he or she is 
allowed to withhold his or her signature and therefore, although an 
arbitrator has the right to furnish a dissenting opinion under English 
law, dissents continue to be relatively rare.56 
To illustrate how English jurisdiction treats dissenting opinions, it 
is helpful to examine the authoritative judgment rendered by the 
English Court of Appeal in Cargill International S.A. v. Sociedad 
Iberica de Molturacion.57 Here, the Court of Appeal faced the 
quandary of whether a dissenting arbitrator in a GAFTA Arbitration 
(under the Grain and Feed Trade Association Rules) could abstain 
from signing the award and express his reasoning for the abstention. 
The court held that if applicable arbitration rules required all three 
arbitrators to sign the award for it to be enforceable, a dissenting 
arbitrator may not abstain from signature simply because the majority 
refused to incorporate his dissent into the award.58 The court also 
opined that it would be mistaken to assume that awards must include 
dissent absent express rules to the contrary in the arbitration 
agreement or applicable arbitration rules.59  
Thus, Lord Justice Waller, in agreement with Lord Justice 
Chadwick and Lord Justice Philips, concluded that a dissenting 
opinion does not form part of the arbitral award. In support of this 
holding and in consonance with Cargill, in 2010 Justice Tomlinson in 
B v. A60 also opined that a dissenting opinion was not part of an 
arbitral award.61  
55 English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 52(3) (emphasis added). 
56 Nigel Rawding QC & Elizabeth Snodgrass, England & Wales: Question 36, 
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (June 27, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/ 
1000187/england-&-wales. 
57 Cargill International SA Antigua (Geneva Branch) v. Sociedad Iberica de 
Molturacion SA [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 489. 
58 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 332. 
59 Id. (citing Cargill International SA Antigua (Geneva Branch) v. Sociedad Iberica de 
Molturacion SA [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 489). 
60 B v. A [2010] EWHC (Comm) 1626 (Eng.), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/ 
Comm/2010/1626.html. 
61 Id. at ¶ 21 (“At this point, I should say a word about the status of the Dissenting 
Opinion. It is not in my view formally part of the Award of the Tribunal . . . A dissenting 
opinion might be admissible as evidence in relation to procedural matters, as where for 
example it is alleged that some aspect of the procedures adopted in the arbitration worked 
unfairly to the disadvantage of one party. . . . So too where the proper law of the disputes 
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These two judgments, read in conjunction with Article 52 of the 
English Arbitration Act, establish that although an arbitrator’s right to 
issue dissenting opinions is respected under English law, these 
opinions are principally considered commentary on the arbitral award. 
Importantly, this indicates that dissenting opinions may be admissible 
as evidence in connection with procedural matters and as a source 
evincing an informatory role for the respective English court when the 
proper law of the dispute is English law and there is an appeal on a 
point of law.62 
2. Swiss Approach
The attitude adopted by English law is replicated in Switzerland.
Swiss arbitration law, outlined in chapter twelve of the Federal Act on 
Private International Law (hereinafter PILA), does not include any 
rule concerning dissenting opinions. However, similar to Article 52 of 
the English Arbitration Act, not only does Article 189 of the PILA 
pay tribute to party autonomy and allow parties to agree on the form 
of an arbitral award, but it also recognizes the decision furnished by 
the majority.63 Thus, although Swiss law does not inhibit dissent, it 
also does not dictate an easily read roadmap for an eager arbitrator to 
follow to convey his concerns regarding an arbitral award.  
Relating to the status of dissenting opinions in Swiss legal practice, 
a certain Swiss Federal Tribunal’s judgment, furnished on May 11, 
1992, proves useful. Within its judgment, the Federal Tribunal held 
that a dissenting arbitrator may not demand his or her opinion be 
incorporated into the arbitral award, nor may he or she demand that 
the dissent be communicated to the parties unless one of the following 
conditions are met: first, the parties’ arbitration agreement dictated 
otherwise; or second, in the absence of this dictation, the majority of 
the arbitral tribunal endorsed it.64 Hence, in a nutshell, Swiss law 
gives party autonomy precedence in the context of the procedure 
is English law and there is an appeal on point of law, I can see that the views of a 
dissenting arbitrator might well inform the decision of the court.”). 
62 See Rawding & Snodgrass, supra note 56. 
63 Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law [CPIL] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 189 
(Switz.) (“(1) The arbitral award shall be made in conformity with the procedure and form 
agreed by the parties; (2) In the absence of such an agreement, the award shall be made by 
a majority decision or, in the absence of a majority, by the presiding arbitrator alone. It 
shall be in writing, reasoned, dated, and signed. The signature of the presiding arbitrator is 
sufficient.”). 
64 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 332. 
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behind rendering dissenting opinions. In addition, although Swiss law 
merits dissenting opinions as a product of due diligence, such dissents 
remain viewed as mere independent opinions, which hold minimal 
influence, are of no legal significance, and fail to contribute to the 
form of the arbitral award.65 
3. Institutional Arbitration Rules
This enduring, dogged silence in national arbitration laws
regarding dissenting opinions is reflected by institutional arbitration 
rules. Due to the limited number of rules unambiguously recognizing 
an arbitrator’s right to issue dissent, institutional arbitration rules 
remain cryptic. However, hope is not lost. With the goal of attaining 
some clarification, the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Arbitration Rules, the Arbitration Rules 
of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute (hereinafter NAI), and the 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC) defy the “silence is golden” rule embraced by the majority 
of arbitral institutions. Article 48(4) of the ICSID Convention, Article 
47(3) of the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, and Article 52(2) 
of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules expressly recognize an 
arbitrator’s right to issue dissenting opinions.66 All three articles 
indistinguishably provide that “[a]ny member of the Tribunal may 
attach his individual opinion to the award, whether he dissents from 
the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent.”67 Correspondingly, 
Article 43(4) of the NAI Arbitration Rules states: “The award shall 
not state a minority opinion. However, a minority may express its 
opinion to the co-arbitrators and the parties in a separate written 
document. This document shall not be considered to be a part of the 
award.”68 
In harmony with the NAI Arbitration Rules, Article 49(5) of the 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules provides that “[a] written dissenting 
opinion shall be kept with the file and may be appended to the award. 
65 Diane Vallée-Grisel, Isabelle Fellrath & Dominique Brown-Berset, Switzerland: 
Question 36, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (June 27, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/ 
jurisdiction/1000208/switzerland. 
 66 See generally ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, art. 48(4), (2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.  
 67 Id. 
68 Netherlands Arbitration Institute [NAI], Arbitration Rules, art. 43(4), (Jan. 1, 2015). 
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. . . [S]uch dissenting opinion shall not form a part of the award.”69 
Unlike the rules of the ICSID, NAI, and CIETAC, the rules of other 
major arbitration institutions, such as the ICC,70 LCIA,71 Swiss 
Chambers’ Arbitration Institution,72 and UNCITRAL,73 do not 
express any rule on dissenting opinions. Thus, although these rules do 
not ban arbitrators from issuing dissenting opinions, they do not 
clearly hearten arbitrators to furnish them.74  
69 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, at art. 49(5). 
70 The practice of dissenting opinion in the context of international commercial 
arbitration was addressed by the ICC’s Commission on International Arbitration via the 
Working Party on Dissenting Opinions. The final report issued by the Working Party 
embraced the possibility of dissenting opinions in ICC arbitrations. ALAN REDFERN & 
MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 576 (2009) 
(“The [Final] Report made a series of sensible suggestions. It did not attempt to rule out 
dissenting opinions and it suggested that the only circumstances in which a dissenting 
opinion should not be sent to the parties with the award was where such opinions were 
prohibited by law or where the validity of the award might be imperiled, either in the place 
of arbitration or—to the extent that this could be foreseen—in the country of 
enforcement.”). 
71 London Court of International Arbitration [LCIA], Arbitration Rules, art. 26(6), 
(2014) [hereinafter LCIA] (“If any arbitrator refuses or fails to sign the award, the 
signatures of the majority or (failing a majority) of the presiding arbitrator shall be 
sufficient, provided that the reason for the omitted signature is stated in the award by the 
majority or by the presiding arbitrator”); Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution [SCAI], 
Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, art. 32(4) (June, 2012) [hereinafter SCAI 
Arbitration Rules] (“Where the arbitral tribunal is composed of more than one arbitrator 
and any of them fails to sign, the award shall state the reason for the absence of the 
signature.”). Although these two articles provide a roadmap as to how to deal with an 
arbitrator’s failure to sign the arbitral award, they do not elucidate how dissenting opinions 
will be tackled. In the presence of this lack of elucidation, any of these three paths may be 
followed in the arbitral institutions’ practice: (1) incorporating dissenting reasons into the 
arbitral award; (2) treating the arbitral award and the dissenting opinion separate from each 
other and communicating them to the arbitrating parties simultaneously, but 
independently; consequently, (3) appending the dissenting opinion to the arbitral award, 
after the signature page of the arbitral award. See Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 335. 
72 SCAI Arbitration Rules, supra note 71. 
73 BORN, supra note 1, at 3054–55 (“During the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, proposals were made to specifically permit dissenting opinions, but insufficient need 
was seen to do so. That is apparently because it was clear that dissenting opinions were 
permissible (absent contrary to agreement), even without express statutory authorization, 
but not to be encouraged.”). Here, notably, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
operating under the UNCITRAL Model Law, expressly recognizes an arbitrator’s right to 
dissent. According to Article 32(3) of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure, “Any arbitrator may request that his dissenting vote or his dissenting vote and 
the reasons therefore be recorded.” Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, at art. 
32(3). 
74 For example, paragraph 39 of the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat 
on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration provides that “the Model Law 
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Here, the arbitration rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter SCC) warrant 
attention. While the 1999 version of the Arbitration Rules of the SCC 
expressly recognized an arbitrator’s right to issue dissenting 
opinions,75 the 2017 version, and its predecessors, employed a 
different stance. The later versions summarily detached the rule 
expressly recognizing an arbitrator’s right to dissent from the text. To 
illustrate, under the current Arbitration Rules of the SCC, where there 
is no unanimity between the arbitrators sitting on the tribunal, Article 
41(1) allows the majority to render any award or other decision.76 In 
addition, Article 42(3) provides that if an arbitrator fails to sign an 
award, the reason behind the omitted signature shall be stated in the 
award either by the majority or the chairperson.77  
These articles make clear that arbitrators may issue dissenting 
opinions. However, reasonable postulation speculates that the SCC 
preferred not to dictate a standard of practice for dissenting opinions. 
Rather, in typical respect for party autonomy and arbitral tribunal’s 
authority, the SCC opted to leave the decision either to the parties’ 
arbitration agreement or to the judgment of the respective tribunal.78 
Evident from discussion thus far, most national arbitration statutes 
and institutional arbitration rules practice silence on the subject of 
dissenting opinions. One can reasonably conclude from this silence a 
desire to be neutral and preclude interference with party autonomy, 
avoid encroaching upon arbitrator liberty, and to maintain objectivity 
in the issuance of dissenting opinions. Today, notwithstanding this 
mainstream “silent” approach (particularly in international 
commercial arbitration), as well as critic repudiation of dissenting 
opinions, it is still well accepted that dissenting opinions are 
neither requires nor prohibits ‘dissenting opinions.’” See Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 3. 
75 SCC Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, at art. 32(4) (1999) (“An arbitrator may attach 
a dissenting opinion to the Award.”). 
76 Id. at art. 41(1) (“Where the Arbitral Tribunal consists of more than one arbitrator, 
any award or other decision shall be made by a majority of the arbitrators or, failing a 
majority, by the Chairperson.”). 
77 Id. at art. 42(3) (“An award shall be signed by the arbitrators. If an arbitrator fails to 
sign an award, the signatures of the majority of the arbitrators or, failing a majority, of the 
Chairperson shall be sufficient, provided that the reason for the omission of the signature 
is stated in the award.”). 
78 See supra text accompanying note 68 as to the possible methods employable by an 
arbitral tribunal with respect to the practice of dissenting opinion in the SCC arbitration. 
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permissible unless the parties’ arbitration agreement dictates 
otherwise or, in the absence of this dictation, the majority of the 
arbitral tribunal rejects it. 
Despite the autonomy enjoyed by arbitrating parties, arbitration 
employs an adjudicative function under which arbitrators act with a 
quasi-judicial capacity.79 Thus, an arbitrator’s right to issue dissent 
not only is an apt concomitant of their quasi-judicial capacity but is 
also corollary to an arbitral tribunal’s obligation to furnish a well-
reasoned award.80 There is, however, continued discourse among 
arbitration scholars and practitioners relating to challenges and 
benefits of dissenting opinions. Worthy of discussion, these alleged 
benefits and disadvantages are explored in the next section. 
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Dissenting Opinions in
International Arbitration 
Although the raison d’être of dissenting opinions was once hotly 
debated, today the center of controversy no longer rests upon the 
reality of dissenting opinions and why they exist. Rather, the debate 
evolved into a modern discussion and evaluation of the admissibility 
of these dissents and whether such admissibility is desirable. 
This Article propounds that, because of the well-accepted reality of 
dissenting opinions in international arbitration, it is a gross waste of 
time and energy to debate about and dwell upon the admissibility or 
desirability of these opinions. Instead, critics must bury their 
respective hatchets and focus instead on using dissent as a beneficial 
tool in international arbitration. This shift in focus will optimize these 
opinions’ benefits and minimize their disadvantages, effectively 
neutralizing any threat posed to international arbitration. To 
successfully accomplish this goal, the following section investigates 
the supposed disadvantages of dissenting opinions and subsequently 
proceeds into their benefits. 
1. Disadvantages of Dissenting Opinions
Antagonists of dissenting opinions rally assorted arguments to
dissuade arbitrators from rendering these opinions. From a critic’s 
point of view, issuing dissenting opinions not only conflicts with 
basic principles of international arbitration but also eventuates in 
79 BORN, supra note 1, at 2127. 
80 See id. at 3055. 
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systemic dysfunction. The following paragraphs discuss seriatim the 
most powerful criticisms rallied against dissenting opinions: concerns 
of dissenting opinions and issues of confidentiality, unease of an 
arbitrator’s neutrality and independence, possible destruction of 
award authority, increased award challenge, and likelihood of cost 
escalation and arbitral inefficiency.  
a. Confidentiality of Arbitral Deliberations and Dissenting Opinions
To begin, the first criticism raised against dissenting opinions
propounds that dissent infringes upon the confidentiality of arbitral 
proceedings because it exposes nonunanimity of the tribunal and, 
further, bares the details behind deliberations. The accuracy of this 
argument hinges upon the following two exigent questions and their 
respective answers: first, how far do the radii of arbitral 
confidentiality and deliberation confidentiality extend?81 Second, do 
dissenting opinions expose the actual content of deliberation or do 
they provide a mere exposé into arbitrator disagreement?82 
The first question debates the scope of the confidentiality principle 
in arbitral proceedings. Broadly speaking, the principle of 
confidentiality is entrenched in international arbitration, especially in 
international commercial arbitration. This essential aspect of the 
arbitral process fulfills an important role in promoting arbitration as 
an effective dispute resolution mechanism, placing it in a catbird seat 
of the international dispute resolution arena.83 Notwithstanding 
confidentiality’s highly regarded position, there remains a substantial 
void in clarity relating to its scope. Nonetheless, what is absolute is 
81 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 337 (“[D]oes it [the rule of secrecy] only include the 
arbitrators’ discussions in the deliberation process, i.e. the arguments exchanged and the 
process by which the arbitrators shaped their view and found a decision, or does it also 
comprise the voting process, i.e. the fact of whether or not the individual arbitrator 
consented to the evaluation of the facts and the application of the law and, consequently, to 
the result of the arbitration proceedings as declared in the award?”). 
82 Id. (“[D]oes a dissenting opinion reveal the actual content of the deliberation, or 
does it only disclose that the arbitrators have differed about the evaluation of the facts 
and/or the interpretation and application of the law?”). 
83 BORN, supra note 1, at 2780 (“Many authorities and users regard confidentiality as 
an essential aspect of the arbitral process, which assists in the effective, efficient resolution 
of international disputes, and which must be given legal effect.”); but see BORN, supra 
note 1, at 2780 (“At the same time, a substantial body of critics deny that confidentiality is 
a necessary or particularly beneficial feature of international arbitral proceedings, or that 
parties have any general legally enforceable right to confidential arbitral proceedings.”). 
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that the confidentiality of arbitrator deliberations falls within the 
radius of the arbitral proceedings’ confidentiality.84  
Therefore, arbitrator deliberations are principally treated as 
confidential. This approach is corroborated by national laws and 
institutional arbitration rules.85 Further, the confidentiality of 
deliberations is embraced by professional guidelines regulating the 
conduct of international arbitrators.86 
Notwithstanding this universal acquiescence to deliberation 
confidentiality in international arbitration, what remains vague is the 
reach of this confidentiality, in both deliberation and dissenting 
opinions. This obscurity unfortunately facilitates castigation and 
alienation of dissenting opinions, resulting in an incomplete and 
incorrect interpretation of the purpose of confidentiality in 
international arbitration. The confidentiality of arbitral deliberations 
does not, and should not, apply to an arbitrator’s formal statement 
regarding the claims submitted to the tribunal.87 Indeed, espousing 
otherwise would not allow an arbitrator to do anything other than sign 
an award with which he or she disagrees, consequently diminishing 
the adjudicative function of an arbitrator.88 In sum, application of the 
principle of confidentiality in this broad manner would limit an 
arbitrator’s findings, lead to irreparable harm to the arbitral system, 
84 See BORN, supra note 1, at 2779–2831. 
85 CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 1469 (Fr.) 
(“The arbitrators’ deliberations are secret.”); LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 71, at art. 
30(2) (“The deliberations of the Arbitral Tribunal shall remain confidential to its members, 
save as required by any applicable law and to the extent that disclosure of an arbitrator’s 
refusal to participate in the arbitration is required of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal 
under Articles 10, 12, 26, and 27.”); SCAI Arbitration Rules, supra note 71, at art. 44(2) 
(“The deliberations of the arbitral tribunal are confidential.”); HKIAC Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 2, at art. 42(4) (“The deliberations of the arbitral tribunal are confidential.”); 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at art. 15(1) (“The deliberations of the Tribunal 
shall take place in private and remain secret.”). 
86 International Bar Association, Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, at art. 9 
(1987) (“The deliberations of the arbitral tribunal, and the contents of the award itself, 
remain confidential in perpetuity unless the parties release the arbitrators from this 
obligation. An arbitrator should not participate in, or give any information for the purpose 
of assistance in, any proceedings to consider the award unless, exceptionally, he considers 
it his duty to disclose any material misconduct or fraud on the part of his fellow 
arbitrators.”); American Arbitration Association, Code of Ethics, Canon VI(B) (2004) 
(“The arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration proceedings 
and decision.”). 
87 BORN, supra note 1, at 3056. 
88 Id. 
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and inevitably result in an outright, de facto ban on dissenting 
opinions.  
Next, the second question relates to the scope of dissenting 
opinions. Obviously, issuing dissent is a serious act and should only 
be pursued with caution. Thus, dissenting arbitrators must heed the 
content of their dissenting opinions and exercise utmost care not to 
reveal the actual substance of the deliberations. So long as the authors 
of dissenting opinions limit their comments to their own assessment 
of facts, analysis, and execution of applicable law (as opposed to 
disclosing who said what, when, and for what purpose), dissenting 
opinions will not breach deliberation confidentiality.89 In sum, 
understood from this evaluation, dissenting opinions do not 
automatically equate to a breach of deliberation confidentiality.  
Notwithstanding this conclusion, breach of confidentiality is but 
one concern related to arbitral deliberation. Next, skeptics of dissent 
criticize dissenting opinions for their supposed success at impeding 
truthful deliberation dialogue. Pursuant to Redfern: 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for arbitrators to have a 
frank and open exchange of views, to advance ideas and proposals, 
to change their mind and then perhaps to change it back again, if 
what they had said and what they had not said, what they had 
thought and what they had not thought, was to become known to the 
parties—particularly in a situation in which two of three members 
of the tribunal are chosen by the parties themselves . . . . 
[A]rbitrators should be able to discuss freely and openly the case
that they have to decide. Yet it is difficult for arbitrators to do this if
there is a risk, real or imaginary, that one of their number will break
the confidence of their discussions, whether by communication with
his or her appointing party, or by means of a dissenting opinion.90
89 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 274 (“The key is that no one reveals the 
discussions themselves, so that arbitrators will be able to express their views frankly, 
without risk that their opinions will be disclosed involuntarily. As long as a dissenting 
opinion does not reveal what occurred during deliberations, it should not be objectionable. 
It is therefore essential that dissenting opinions not reveal actual content of 
deliberations.”); see also Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 337–38. 
90 Redfern, supra note 7, at 239; see also van den Berg, supra note 11, at 829–30 (“A 
party-appointed arbitrator who believes that he or she should support (or even improve) 
the case advanced by the party that appointed him or her is not likely to engage in 
meaningful dialogue about the case with his or her colleagues. . . . [I]n turn, will soon 
discover that there is a quasi-advocate among the members of the tribunal. The result may 
be either that the presiding arbitrator and the other party-appointed arbitrator will no 
longer take the advocate-arbitrator seriously or that the other party-appointed arbitrator 
will do the same relative to his or her co-arbitrators. In both cases, the deliberative process 
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Gleaned from Redfern’s statement is the worry that the threat of 
dissent renders other tribunal members incapable of soundly 
deliberating facts and issues. However, this anxiety is foolish and 
should neither result in inhibition nor prevent arbitrators from frank 
and open exchange. This supposed inability to hold dialogue 
truthfully should not act as a scapegoat and oppress dissent. 
Regardless of whether dissenting opinions are permitted, the risk of 
breaching confidentiality by any tribunal member will forever hang 
over arbitral deliberations (not solely ones with dissenting 
arbitrators).91 Therefore, the simple chance that a member will issue a 
dissenting opinion should not act as condition precedent to frank and 
open discourse among tribunal members. 
Notwithstanding these perils, the Arbitration Rules of the ICSID 
seek to balance the risks with the advantages of dissenting opinions. 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules explicitly provide for the confidentiality 
of deliberations, while simultaneously recognizing the right to 
dissent.92 Thus, not only do these rules defy the cynicism of 
dissenting opinions but they also demonstrate that dissenting opinions 
and deliberation confidentiality may exist symbiotically so long as 
dissenting arbitrators exercise utmost care and due diligence.93  
In sum, unless dissenting arbitrators disclose or comment upon 
statements purportedly made throughout deliberations or anterior 
drafts of awards, or reveal the actual substance of the deliberations, 
there exist no “alternative facts” upon which to found an equation 
correlating dissenting opinions with breach in confidentiality. 
b. Relationship Between Parties and Party-Appointed Arbitrators
The next major contention rallied against dissenting opinions
relates to arbitrator neutrality and independence. Here, critics of 
breaks down. Moreover, arbitrators cannot freely exchange views with the prospect that a 
dissenting opinion inspired by party-partisanship may be forthcoming.”). 
91 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 338. 
92 ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at art. 15(1) (“the deliberations of the 
Tribunal shall take place in private and remain secret”); ICSID Arbitration Rules, art. 
47(3) (“any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award, 
whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent.”). 
93 BORN, supra note 1, at 3057 (“The fact that arbitrators are permitted to issue 
dissenting or separate opinions does not mean that they should—or even are entitled to—
issue any dissenting opinion or separate opinion that they choose. . . . Moreover, not unlike 
the making of arbitral awards, the making of a dissenting opinion is a serious act, that 
implicates the arbitrator’s personal duties of impartiality, confidentiality, collegiality and 
diligence.”). 
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dissenting opinions argue that absent some extenuating 
circumstances, dissents are the fruit of sectarianism exercised by 
party-nominated arbitrators. Hence, these opinions are tainted by a 
preexisting connection between parties and their designated 
arbitrators. Consequently, doubt is automatically cast upon the 
legitimacy of the award-making process and the arbitral award.  
Leading arbitration scholar, practitioner, and holder of the Michael 
R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair, Jan Paulsson, voiced the first
major concern of arbitrator impartiality in his inaugural lecture at
Miami University in April 2010.94 In his lecture, Paulsson advocated
a major reform in the fabric of international commercial arbitration.
In a nutshell, he criticized arbitrator impartiality within the context of
the established practice of unilateral appointments and propounded
the idea to “forbid, or at least rigorously polic[e]”95 the practice of
unilateral appointments to preserve the impartial arbitration concept.96
To substantiate his claim of arbitrator favoritism, Paulsson relied 
upon statistics exhibiting that dissenting opinions are almost always 
issued in favor of the aggrieved party who appointed the dissenting 
arbitrator. On this point, he particularly stated: 
We must confront an uncomfortable fact. Two recent studies of 
international commercial arbitrations have revealed that dissenting 
opinions were almost invariably (in more than 95% of the cases) 
written by the arbitrator nominated by the losing party. This 
troubling record is duplicated in the newer field of treaty-based 
arbitrations brought by foreign investors against states.97  
Evident from this data, Paulsson illustrated the lack of good faith 
on behalf of arbitrators as a direct result of unilateral party 
appointment. Accordingly, he proposed a deviation from the status 
quo of unilateral appointment, in favor of either choosing an arbitrator 
from a preexisting list or arbitrator appointment by a neutral body or 
joint agreement of the parties for the purpose of enhancing legitimacy 
in international arbitration.98  
94 Professor Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 
Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair, 
University of Miami School of Law (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/ 
media/0/12773749999020/ paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf. 
95 Id. at 8. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. at 8–9 (citing Alan Redfern, Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial 
Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT’L 223–242 (2004)). 
98 Id. at 11–12. 
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Perhaps inspired by Paulsson’s discomfort for current unilateral 
party appointment, Albert Jan van den Berg, a prominent arbitration 
scholar and practitioner, similarly “question[ed] the neutrality of 
party-appointed arbitrators based upon his finding that nearly all of 
the publicly available dissenting opinions in investment arbitrations 
were issued by the arbitrator appointed by the party that lost the 
case.”99 Consequently, van den Berg cast a shadow over arbitrator 
independence and neutrality and admonished party-appointed 
arbitrators to act more in accord with the principle nemine 
dissentiente for the sake of a better operating and credible investment 
arbitration system.100 
Prompting van den Berg to recommend avoiding dissenting 
opinions were findings from a self-conducted survey of dissenting 
opinions in 150 publicly reported arbitral awards and decisions 
rendered in investment arbitration.101 The outcome of the survey 
showed that there were 34 cases where a party-appointed arbitrator 
issued a dissenting opinion. Of great concern was the fact that in 
nearly all 34 dissenting opinions the arbitrator dissented in favor of 
the aggrieved appointing party. This raised significant disquiet and 
sparked controversy, not only about arbitrator impartiality but also 
about the practice of dissenting opinion and its raison d’être in 
international investment arbitration.102 It should not go unnoticed that 
the same concern and controversy would likely apply in international 
commercial arbitration.103 
In this snow globe that is international arbitration, where dissenting 
opinions flurry, the pertinent question turns to whether dissenting 
99 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 27. 
100 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 834. 
101 See id. at 821–43. 
102 Id. at 824 (“The 150 decisions show that the presiding arbitrator rarely dissents. . . . 
The 150 decisions also show that a party-appointed arbitrator issued a dissenting opinion 
in 34 cases (that is, in approximately 22 percent of the 150 cases under analysis). . . . The 
astonishing fact is that nearly all of those 34 dissenting opinions were issued by the 
arbitrator appointed by the party that lost the case in whole or in part. A nearly 100 percent 
score of dissenting opinions in favor of the party that appointed the dissenting arbitrator is 
statistically significant. . . . That nearly 100 percent of the dissents favor the party that 
appointed the dissenter raises concerns about neutrality.”). 
103 Redfern, supra note 7, at 234 (“The ICC in Paris publishes annual statistics which 
show, amongst other things, the number of awards that it sends out each year which are 
accompanied by, or include dissenting opinions. In 2001, there were 24 dissenting 
opinions. In 22 of these, where it was possible to identify the dissenting arbitrator, the 
dissent was made in favour of the party that had appointed him or her.”); see also van den 
Berg, supra note 11, at 832–33. 
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opinions result from an honest difference of opinion between 
arbitrators or if they are something more sinister and reflect either 
pressures placed upon arbitrators by the appointing party or a desire 
to cater to the appointing party’s interests. 
Commentators diverge in their conclusions to this question. 
Unsurprisingly, how this question is answered reflects how arbitration 
scholars and practitioners polarize. On one end of the spectrum, 
commentators argue that the prevalence of dissenting opinions issued 
by arbitrators in favor of the appointing party signals obvious bias, 
inferring that party-appointed arbitrators have a propensity to dissent 
simply to display a posture in favor of their appointing party. This 
finding debases the legitimacy of the arbitral process.104 On the other 
end of the spectrum, some commentators argue (and this Article 
concurs) that dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators are 
“the reflection of their shared outlook with the party who appointed 
them . . .”105 and they do not detract from the legitimacy of the arbitral 
process; on the contrary, they play a critical role toward enhancing 
it.106 
Unsurprisingly, one of the most prominent advocates of the former 
view is van den Berg. To substantiate his argument, van den Berg 
relies upon the conclusions of his survey correlating party-appointed 
arbitrators with dissent authorship.107 From van den Berg’s 
perspective, party-appointed arbitrators use dissenting opinions as a 
mere means to showcase cloaked support in favor of the appointing 
party. Van den Berg argues that not only does this superficial support 
104 Redfern, supra note 7, at 234 (citing De Boisséson, Le Droit Français de 
l’Arbitrage National et International 802 (1998) (“[C]ertain arbitrators, so as not to lose 
the confidence of the company or the state which appointed them, will be tempted, if they 
have not put their point of view successfully in the course of the tribunal’s deliberation, 
systematically to draw up a dissenting opinion and to insist that it be communicated to the 
parties.”)). See also Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 275 (“Although party-appointed 
arbitrators are supposed to be impartial and independent in international arbitrations, some 
believe that with the availability of dissent, arbitrators may feel pressure to support the 
party that appointed them and to disclose that support.”). 
105 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 32 (citing Jacques Werner, Dissenting 
Opinions: Beyond Fears, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 23, 25 (1992)). 
106  Id. at 27 (“[D]issenting opinions play a critical role in fostering the legitimacy of 
international arbitration, particularly investment arbitration.”); Fraga & Samra, supra note 
11, at 464 (“Indeed, taking a more deliberate view, some commentators have observed, 
and we agree, that dissenting opinions can play a ‘critical role in fostering the legitimacy 
of international arbitration, particularly investment arbitration.’”). 
107 See supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
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conflict with arbitrator neutrality but it also infects arbitral decision-
making, effectively soiling the award-making process. In particular, 
van den Berg states: 
That nearly 100 percent of the dissents favor the party that 
appointed the dissenter raises concerns about neutrality. While 
treaty law and arbitration rules allow dissents, they also require that 
an arbitrator be impartial and independent . . . . Few exceptions for 
party-appointed arbitrator exist . . . . [I]t is also an implied duty that 
they ensure that the tribunal consider the arguments of the party that 
appointed them. This duty does not, however, mean that the party-
appointed arbitrator may act as an advocate for the party that 
appointed him or her. The nearly 100 percent score is difficult to 
reconcile with the neutrality requirement. . . . [I]t is hard to see how 
dissenting opinions enhance the quality of arbitral decision-making 
given that almost 100 percent of the dissents are issued by party-
appointed arbitrators and almost 100 percent of them favor the 
party that appointed the dissenter.108 
From van den Berg’s point of view, due to the prevalence of 
dissenting opinions furnished by an arbitrator in favor of the 
appointing party, party-appointed arbitrators act as the party’s 
musketeers. At the conclusion of van den Berg’s work, he suggests 
that those arbitrators prone to deviate from the majority adhere to the 
principle nemine dissentiente and acquiesce to the majority for a 
better and more authoritative investment arbitration system.109 
In his argument, van den Berg failed to properly recapitulate 
unilateral appointments. Simply because dissenting arbitrators, more 
likely than not, are appointed by the losing party does not, and should 
not, conclusively bespeak ethical failure on behalf of arbitrators.110 
Helpful to remember is that each arbitrating party obviously desires 
an outcome favorable to his or her interests. By the very nature of 
unilateral appointments, each party is allowed to enhance its chance 
of success by selecting arbitrators who initially assist the appointing 
party. Hence, it is not idiosyncratic that “co-arbitrators, selected by 
each party independently, would have views about legal, commercial 
and cultural issues that made the co-arbitrators more likely to be 
108 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 825 (emphasis added). 
109 Id. at 834. 
110 In the same vein, see Paulsson, supra note 94, at 9 (“The fact that dissenting 
arbitrators are nearly always those who have been appointed by the party aggrieved by the 
majority decision does not in and of itself point to a failure of ethics.”); Stippl & 
Öhlberger, supra note 45, at 390 (“Furthermore, to dissent in favor of the nominating party 
does not per se mean that the respective arbitrator is violating his duties of impartiality and 
independence.”). 
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responsive to his or her nominating party.”111 This, however, does not 
necessarily vindicate an arbitrator’s breach of the duty of impartiality. 
Unavoidably and on occasion, an arbitrator lacking integrity may 
employ a partisan stance and issue dissent to guard one party’s 
interests and contaminate the arbitral process. Thus, although we 
would naturally like to believe that all arbitrators are honorable in 
discharging their duties, they are human and possess human frailties. 
Obviously, this possible scenario cannot be ignored in a discussion of 
dissent and arbitrator impartiality. 
At this juncture, it is beneficial to explore the nexus between 
unilateral appointments, dissenting opinions, and a lack of arbitrator 
neutrality and independence. Akin to a doctor and patient, to 
effectively treat an illness, the illness must be properly diagnosed. To 
better manage the illness causing systematic dysfunction in 
arbitration, we must find the root of the disease. Here, in line with van 
den Berg’s work,112 this Article argues that the root of dysfunction, 
relating to arbitrator neutrality and independence, rests upon the 
method of arbitrator appointment.113 Unfortunately, where van den 
Berg erred in his solution was his premise to rid the arbitral system of 
dissenting opinions: “Until that moment [the moment all arbitrators 
act independent and impartial] has come, investment arbitration 
would function better and be more credible if party-appointed 
arbitrators observe the principle: nemine dissentiente.”114 
Lamentably, this recommendation can neither extinguish the 
apprehension concerning arbitrator neutrality and independence nor 
can it effectively preclude a dishonorable party-appointed arbitrator 
111 BORN, supra note 1, at 3061; Melanie van Leeuwen, Pride and Prejudice in the 
Debate on Arbitrator Independence, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 14 (2013) (“Anyone with considerable experience as 
counsel in international arbitration can confirm that preference on the part of clients. It is 
common practice that prior to the appointment of an arbitrator, a fair amount of due 
diligence is conducted by the appointing party and its counsel into the potential 
arbitrator(s), his or her professional experience, his or her academic writings and the 
previously issued arbitral awards that that arbitrator has rendered in other cases. When 
given the opportunity, it is only natural that a party will appoint an arbitrator, who—based 
on the outcome of such investigation—is deemed likely to view the issues in dispute in a 
manner that is positive for the case that it will be putting forward.”). 
112 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 834 (“The root of the problem is the appointment 
method. Unilateral appointments may create arbitrators who may be dependent in some 
way on the parties that appointed them.”). 
113 See Paulsson, supra note 94; van den Berg, supra note 11. 
114 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 834. 
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from serving the interests of the appointing party. Thus, van den 
Berg’s argument that the arbitral system will strengthen if dissenting 
opinions are forsaken simply does not hold water. Because dissenting 
opinions are not the root cause of the disease in arbitral dysfunction, 
ridding the system of a tool with which an arbitrator may express his 
or her reasons of dissent will only result in further sullying the 
system. Because disposal of dissenting opinions is far from the best 
tactic, our attention must recalibrate toward a greater focus on 
“improving” unilateral appointment. With this minimal compromise, 
the elixir of arbitrator rehabilitation is found. 
Noted earlier, although prevalence is low, some arbitrators who 
lack integrity may support an appointing party by transgressing 
ethical codes and exploiting dissenting opinions. This misuse of 
dissenting opinions is an inevitable side effect of unilateral 
appointments and clearly poses “a moral hazard”115 to international 
arbitration. According to Paulsson, “The unilaterally nominated 
arbitrator is the product of realism, doubtless indispensable in a 
complex world of intercommunal transactions, as a way of making 
arbitration acceptable—though in a manner which immediately 
dilutes its purity.”116 Clearly, Paulsson perceives the practice of 
unilateral appointments as jeopardizing the veracity and integrity of 
the arbitral process.117 Thus, he proposed two alternative methods of 
appointment: first, arbitrator appointments may be made by joint 
agreement of the parties or by a neutral body; second, arbitrator 
appointment may be made from a preexisting list of arbitrators.118 
Regretfully, Paulsson’s proposals opened a Pandora’s box, not only 
for the practice of unilateral appointments and arbitrator neutrality, 
but also for dissenting opinions. In response to Paulsson, Messrs. 
Brower and Rosenberg take exception to his assumption that party-
appointed arbitrators are inherently unreliable and exercise tendencies 
contravening their personal duties of impartiality and 
115 See Paulsson, supra note 94. To see how Paulsson presents the hazard that the 
party-appointed arbitrator poses, see Paulsson, supra note 94, at 6 (“Many persons serving 
as arbitrator seem to have no compunction about quietly assisting ‘their’ party; they 
apparently view the modern international consensus that all arbitrators owe a duty to 
maintain an equal distance to both sides as little more than pretty words, as though 
sophisticates in reality conduct themselves in accordance with a different sub rosa 
operational code.”). 
116 Id. at 9. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 Id. at 11. 
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independence.119 In response to Paulsson’s negative view of unilateral 
appointment,120 Messrs. Brower and Rosenberg argue that it is a 
party’s right to designate their arbitrator. Specifically, they propound 
that “[i]t is beyond debate, however, that at the time Paulsson 
expressed his views such right had in fact existed for decades, even 
centuries, and that this right has been one of the most attractive 
aspects of arbitration as an alternative to domestic litigation.”121 
Pursuant to Messrs. Brower and Rosenberg, a party’s right to 
appoint an arbitrator is a basic arbitration principle, entrenched from 
distillation of centuries of practical experience.122  
Undeniably, the practice of unilateral appointments not only 
manifests party autonomy but also acts as a primary incentive for 
parties to pursue arbitration rather than litigation. Unilateral 
appointment allows parties to participate in the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, giving parties a sense of propinquity with the arbitral 
process.123 With each party holding the reins of arbitrator 
119 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 8. Charles Brower is an eminent arbitration 
practitioner, who served as Judge of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal as well as 
Judge Ad Hoc of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Brower is a Member of 20 
Essex Street Chambers and a Professional Lecturer at George Washington University 
School of Law. Charles Rosenberg is a renowned arbitration practitioner at White & Case. 
Together, Brower and Rosenberg criticize the stance of Paulsson and van den Berg in their 
respective opposition to issuing dissenting opinions in arbitration. 
120 Paulsson, supra note 94, at 8 (“The best way to avoid such incidents is clearly to 
forbid, or at least rigorously police, the practice of unilateral appointments. This would 
involve a significant change in prevailing practices, because the fact is that arbitrations 
routinely begin with each side naming an arbitrator. References are occasionally made to 
‘the fundamental right’ to name one’s arbitrator. But there is no such right. Moreover, if it 
existed, it would certainly not be fundamental.”). 
121 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 9–11. 
122 English Arbitration Act 1996, § 16; Turkish International Arbitration Law, art. 7 
(Turk.); Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 11 (UNCITRAL 
amended 2006); ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 4, at art. 37; ICC Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 2, at art. 12; SCC Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, at art. 17; Istanbul 
Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules, art. 14; see also Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 
37, at 9–11. 
123 Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral 
Hazard in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010), http:// 
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-
on-jan-paulssons-moral-hazard-in-international-arbitration/ (“[U]nilateral appointments 
serve a broader purpose: by appointing an arbitrator, the parties—rightly or wrongly—get 
a sense of proximity with the process. Unilateral appointments give the parties the 
impression that they control the arbitration, and that is an important difference between 
arbitration and court litigation.”); BORN, supra note 1, at 1807 (“More fundamentally . . . 
that parties agree to arbitrate precisely in order to retain, insofar as possible, control over 
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appointment, they are able to nominate an altruistic arbitrator, 
favorable to their case. However, evidently, this direct contact 
between arbitrator and appointing party casts doubt upon arbitrator 
impartiality, independence, and by extension, the legitimacy of 
international arbitration. It is thus not infrequent to hear contentions 
that “co-arbitrators tend to exhibit sympathies for the parties that 
nominated them.”124 
The sympathy expressed by appointed arbitrators toward “their 
party” should not ignite skepticism. Rather, it should be regarded as a 
byproduct of the comprehensive autonomy bestowed upon parties. 
This autonomy accords parties carte blanche to nominate their 
arbitrators and, accordingly, facilitates each party’s access to a desired 
outlook, knowledge, understanding, and expertise germane to the 
dispute. Hence, co-arbitrators are naturally more likely than not to 
express sympathy for the appointing party.  
Of course, there are instances where parties nominate an arbitrator 
who has a predilection to disregard his or her duty of impartiality and 
independence and easily step into the position of advocate. Today, 
however, there is “widespread awareness, amongst the users of 
arbitration, that hired guns do them more harm” than good.125 
Moreover, the majority of arbitrators perceive bias to be a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing. In the long run, bias in one case undermines his or 
her integrity in a tribunal and will result in negative future 
repercussions.126 As to the minority of arbitrators not cautious about 
the resolution of ‘their’ dispute and a substantial measure of participation in constitution of 
the tribunal that will decide the dispute.”). 
124 BORN, supra note 1, at 1807 (citing Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the 
Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 33 Columbia FDI Perspectives 1, 2 (2010) (“In my judgment, 
all arbitrators sitting in investment disputes should be appointed by a neutral institution; 
bilateral investment treaties should be amended to achieve this. International investment 
arbitration would thus set a potent example for general emulation in international 
arbitration.”)). See Paulsson, supra note 94; see van den Berg, supra note 11. 
125 Mourre, supra note 123. 
126 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 15; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 70, at 
266–67 (“Experienced practitioners recognize that the deliberate appointment of a partisan 
arbitrator is counterproductive, because the remaining arbitrators will very soon perceive 
what is happening and the influence of the partisan arbitrator during the tribunal’s 
deliberations will be diminished. It is a far better policy to appoint a person who may, by 
reason of culture or background, be broadly in sympathy with the case theory to be put 
forward (e.g., someone who is known to favour a strict literal interpretation of contracts 
rather than look to the true intention of the parties), but who will be strictly impartial when 
it comes to assessing the facts and evaluating the arguments on fact and law.”); Mourre, 
supra note 123 (“[P]arties want to appoint arbitrators who will be listened [to] and 
respected within the tribunal. And parties know that the standing and reputation of 
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the risks affiliated with apparent bias, when circumstances induce 
justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, 
there are mechanisms available to arbitral institutions and parties to 
eliminate that arbitrator. For example, upon the respective 
institution’s initiative, at the written request of all other members of 
the arbitral tribunal, or upon a written challenge by any party, a biased 
arbitrator may be removed from appointment.127 
Although the practice of unilateral appointments has shortcomings, 
the problems germane to arbitrator impartiality and independence do 
not per se emanate from the practice of unilateral appointments, nor 
are the problems exacerbated by dissenting opinions. On the contrary, 
the combination of party-appointed arbitrators and the issuance of 
dissenting opinions legitimizes the system, as it gives the arbitrator a 
chance to express different views and explain the reasoning behind 
the departure from the majority.128  
Although unilateral appointments clearly affect an arbitrator’s 
behavior, even more likely to influence said behavior are the 
dynamics evinced by the arbitral market. Arbitrators sitting on 
tribunals may espouse different behavioral patterns contingent upon 
their status in the market.129 To illustrate, close-knit arbitral 
communities commonly incorporate “elite” arbitrators who are 
repetitively nominated to serve on arbitral tribunals. By virtue of their 
experienced international arbitrators depend from their capacity to exercise independent 
judgment when deliberating with their colleagues. As a consequence, party-appointed 
arbitrators tend to be selected more for their reputation of impartiality and integrity than 
for their supposed willingness to support their appointing party’s thesis.”); Daphna 
Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite 
Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 90 (2010) (“[T]he arbitrators’ valuable 
professional reputation could be a key incentive for them to remain impartial. Impartiality 
critically affects not only their future selection as arbitrators but also other spheres of their 
professional careers, whether as private counsel or as academics. In order to promote their 
reputation, arbitrators may choose to increase accuracy and to counter any real perceived 
biases rather than to cater to any particular interests. This tendency rings especially true for 
repeat arbitrators in the arbitration market, whose most valuable trait may be their 
reputation as credible and independent decision makers.”). 
127 LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 71, at art. 10; ICC Arbitration Rules, supra 
note 2, at art. 14; Istanbul Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules, art. 16; ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, supra note 4, at art. 57; Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 12 
(UNCITRAL amended 2006); English Arbitration Act of 1996, § 24(1)(a); Swiss Federal 
Code on Private International Law [CPIL] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 180(1); Turkish 
International Arbitration Law, art. 7(c) (Turk.). 
128 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 44. 
129 Kapeliuk, supra note 126, at 68. 
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secure status, these experienced arbitrators are more prone to exercise 
different behavioral patterns than novices.130 Where seasoned 
members may prioritize collegiality of the arbitral tribunal and thus 
tend to compromise and acquiesce to the majority, the newer 
members may feel it necessary to accentuate their uniqueness.131 On 
this point, Daphna Kapeliuk particularly states: 
The larger the pool of newcomers, the harder it is for these 
newcomers to be selected. Once these newcomers are appointed, 
market pressure may lead them to behave strategically by 
accentuating their uniqueness. In order to attract the attention of 
prospective disputing parties, they may try to stand out from the 
other members of the tribunal by rendering dissenting opinions.132 
In other words, the dynamics of the arbitral market may prove of 
greater influence over an arbitrator’s integrity and use of dissent than 
unilateral appointment. Notable here, relating to the arbitral market, is 
the existence of a rivalry between elite arbitrators and newcomers. In 
the shadow of this rivalry, newcomers, hoping to make names for 
themselves, may depart from the duties of impartiality and 
independence and use dissenting opinions, not only as a valve to 
relieve themselves of the arbitral market’s pressure but also as an 
instrument to invoke the attention of prospective disputing parties to 
secure future arbitrator nominations. Unsurprisingly, this behavior is a 
shortcoming of unilateral appointment. 
Although unilateral appointment may cause novices to participate 
in this unsavory behavior, the cure is not a complete desertion of the 
practice of unilateral appointments. Rather, a solution may rest in the 
adoption of a blind method to nominate arbitrators. Here, the 
International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) 
Rules for Administered Arbitration of International Disputes of 2014 
espouse such a method termed “the screened selection of party-
designated arbitrators.”133 Not only does this process preserve party 
130 Id. 
131 This is not to say that elite arbitrators never issue dissenting opinions. In fact, there 
are numerous well-known arbitrators who, without concern for their prospective appoint-
ment, issue dissenting opinions. Here, important to compare, are the differing motives 
among arbitrators when they issue dissenting opinions and how surrounding circumstances 
(such as the dynamics of the arbitral market) control these motives. 
132 Kapeliuk, supra note 126, at 68. 
133 International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution [CPR], 2014 CPR 
Rules for Administered Arbitration of International Disputes, rule 5(4), (2014). The 
screened selection process for party-designated arbitrators (also called “a blind method of 
nominating arbitrators”) is dictated under Rule 5(4), which provides, “If the parties have 
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inclusion in arbitrator appointment134 but it also insulates arbitrators 
from the internal dynamics of the arbitral market by cutting off the 
direct link between arbitrators and appointing parties.135 In other 
words, the screened selection process warrants objectivity and 
eliminates the risk of arbitrator favoritism while conserving a party’s 
ability to influence the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  
The drawback of this process is that it deprives the appointing 
parties of the chance to interview the prospective arbitrator prior to 
making an appointment and, accordingly, creates dependency solely 
upon publicly available information and personal recommendations. 
However, this drawback can be resolved if the administrating arbitral 
institution conducts interviews on behalf of appointing parties and in 
accord with their demands.  
In sum, it is neither fair nor accurate to paint unilateral 
appointments and dissenting opinions as the roots of all complication 
relating to arbitrator neutrality and independence. In fact, limiting or 
eradicating unilateral appointments and/or dissenting opinions would 
resultantly shatter any legitimacy of international arbitration and 
hinder its future development and attractiveness. Thus, for unilateral 
appointments to be free of criticism, a nice compromise lies in the 
screened selection process. Further, relating to dissenting opinions, 
per Laurent Levy, “[I]t is preferable to eliminate or penalize abuses 
rather than the means, otherwise useful, which are used to commit 
them.”136 Hence, useful here would be the development of a code of 
ethics for dissenting arbitrators to follow. Such a code would remove 
agreed on a Tribunal consisting of three arbitrators, two of whom are to be designated by 
the parties without knowing which party designated each of them. . . .(d) Neither CPR nor 
the parties shall advise or otherwise provide any information or indication to any arbitrator 
candidate or appointed arbitrator as to which party selected either of the party-designated 
arbitrators. No party or anyone acting on its behalf shall have any ex parte communi-
cations relating to the case with any arbitrator candidate or appointed arbitrator . . .” 
134 Ben Giaretta, Blind Appointment of Arbitrators: The Way Forward? (Feb. 21, 
2017), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/blind-appointment-of-
arbitrators-the-way-forward/. 
135 Recent Study Supports CPR’s Screened Selection Process for Arbitrators, INT’L 
INSTITUTION FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.cpradr.org/news-publications/press-releases/2016-12-15-recent-study-
supports-cpr-s-screened-selection-process-for-arbitrators. 
136 Stippl & Öhlberger, supra note 45, at 391 (citing Laurent Levy, Dissenting 
Opinions in International Arbitration in Switzerland, 5 ARB. INT’L 35, 39 (1989)). 
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any doubt cast upon the practice of dissenting opinion by the 
luminaries in the field.137 
c. Debilitation of the Majority Opinion
The third major principle employed to discredit dissenting opinions
is the criticism that dissent negatively affects an award’s authority. 
Proponents of this critique view dissenting opinions as eclipsing an 
arbitral award’s legitimacy and power. Alan Redfern particularly 
argues that “dissenting opinions may endanger the efficacy of the 
process”138 and that “the dissenting arbitrator risks bringing the 
arbitral process itself into disrepute.”139  
Undeniably, dissenting opinions do harbor the risk of igniting 
debate on the merits of a final decision and may pollute the legitimacy 
and power of an award. However, also undeniable, is that dissenting 
opinions are not part of the arbitral award itself. Rather, they are 
“merely an independent opinion which remains foreign to the award 
and which neither affects the ruling nor the reasons.”140 Accordingly, 
dissenting opinions, devoid of authority, do not principally menace 
the legitimacy and power of the award.  
Evident from Paulsson’s and van den Berg’s distaste for dissenting 
opinions as a means by which minority arbitrators may damage award 
validity, there exists no rational correlation between dissenting 
opinions and award legitimacy. Rather, legitimacy and power of the 
rendered award rests in the parties’ arbitration agreement and agreed-
upon rules and framework.141 Absent actual deficiencies in the arbitral 
award or award-making process, a dissenting opinion does not detract 
from the award’s legitimacy and power.142 Instead, the real 
debilitating impact of a dissenting opinion is commensurate with 
deficiencies in the award, upon which the dissenting arbitrator casts 
light. 
Notably, how an arbitrator chooses to render dissent is of great 
import. When disagreement transpires, human nature reflects that 
137 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 832; see Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24. 
138 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 70, at 577. 
139 Redfern, supra note 7, at 241; see also van den Berg, supra note 11, at 828. 
140 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 339. 
141 Patricia Jimenez Kwast, Prohibitions on Dissenting Opinions in International 
Arbitration, in WHAT’S WRONG WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? 128, 135 (2015). 
142 Id. (“If a dissenting opinion has any weakening effect on the authority of an award, 
it is because the dissent points to actual flaws in the award. The dissent does not create 
them, it merely points them out.”). 
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different people express disagreement in diverse ways. These 
expressions of disagreement range from well-mannered chivalry to 
those evincing non compos mentis. Similarly, if an arbitrator departs 
from the majority, there are various tools available to the arbitrator to 
formulate his or her dissent.143 Thus, how a dissent is formulated may 
have solemn influence over the legitimacy and power of the award. 
Therefore, to preserve the status of arbitration as a desirable venue 
to resolve disputes, dissenting opinions should be succinct and polite 
with no exhibition “of conceit or petulance.”144 Additionally, the 
dissent should be limited solely to the issues leading to the deviation 
and should not morph into an attack upon the other tribunal members 
or scathe the manner in which the arbitral process transpired.145  
To illustrate the import of professionalism when issuing dissenting 
opinions, it is helpful to examine a “what not to do” example. In this 
regard, Professor Georges Abi-Saab’s dissent, concerning the 
decision on jurisdiction and merits in the ConocoPhillips Petrozuata 
B.V. case is demonstrative.146 The professor accused the majority of
legitimizing “a subjective make-believe world of its creation; a virtual
reality in order to fend off probable objective reality.”147 Further, he
claimed that the decision made by the majority constituted “a legal
comedy of errors on the theatre of the absurd, not to say travesty of
justice, that makes mockery not only of ICSID arbitration but of the
very idea of adjudication.”148
This dissent is a prime example of “what not to do.” An opinion 
formatted with such evident hostility does not benefit the arbitral 
system. Rather, it “risks bringing the arbitral process itself into 
disrepute.”149  
143 See Redfern, supra note 7. 
144 Id. at 228 (“The advantage of these ‘good’ dissents is that they permit an arbitrator 
to express disagreement, without what may be seen as a show of conceit, or petulance. 
And without imperiling the authority of the award.”). 
145 Id. at 229. 
146 ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips 
Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/321. 
147 Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab, ConocoPhillips Petrozuata 
B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30 at 24, ¶ 67 (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/ cases/321.
148 Id.; see also BORN, supra note 1, at 3058 n.287. 
149 Redfern, supra note 7, at 241. 
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Consequently, the legitimacy and power of an arbitral award 
should not be contingent upon whether a dissenting opinion exists. In 
principal, the dissenting opinion solely exposes flaws harbored in the 
award. Accordingly, if an arbitral award is premised upon a solid 
foundation, the dissenting opinion can neither taint nor weaken the 
legitimacy and power of the award. Thus, what should be credited in 
an award is not unanimity, as unanimity may easily be fabricated. 
Rather, of import is the quality of the legal argument on which the 
award is founded and rendered. Hence, whether an award is rendered 
by majority or unanimity is irrelevant and the method by which an 
award earns legitimacy should not cloud the vision of the parties, nor 
should it negatively affect the perspective of the public. 
d. Likelihood of Award Obstruction
As previously stated, dissenting opinions are independent from
arbitral awards and therefore do not influence the final ruling, dictate 
the reasons upon which the award is premised, or undermine the 
award’s legitimacy and power. However, skeptics in this branch of 
criticism propound that dissenting opinions create an environment 
where challenges to an award spread like wildfire.150 In line with this 
critique, a dissenting opinion may provide the losing party with an 
instrument to orchestrate a challenge aimed at either award vacation 
or impeding award enforcement.151 
Although dissenting opinions may facilitate legal challenges, this 
concern is largely unfounded, as dissenting opinions are bereft of 
authority.152 In principal, “a dissenting opinion criticizing ordinary 
issues of fact and law should not actually imperil the authority of the 
award and its ability to be recognized and enforced under the New 
York Convention.”153 Simply put, dissenting opinions may be 
regarded as an outcome of the modern departure from conducting de 
novo review due to arbitration-friendly policies.  
Again, at the risk of redundancy, dissents pose no menace to the 
validity or recognition and enforcement of an award.154 However, 
150 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 828 (“Dissents may impair enforcement and 
incentivize a dissatisfied party to move to annul the award.”). 
151 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 339 (“[I]t is suggested that it [a dissenting opinion] 
may set the scene for an action to set aside the award or for objections to be raised at the 
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where a dissenting opinion exposes serious flaws subject to judicial 
review under germane applicable law, or which constitute a ground 
according to which the enforcement and recognition of the award can 
be inhibited, it may be possible for the dissenting arbitrator to 
jeopardize the award’s validity and enforcement.155 In other words, 
the impact of dissenting opinions upon both the breadth of scrutiny 
exercised by a competent authority and an award’s enforcement and 
recognition is directly commensurate with the severity of flaws in the 
award exposed by the dissenting arbitrator. 
To illustrate: in 2009, the English High Court encountered such an 
award.156 Here, the arbitral tribunal awarded £1,856,597.90 to the 
claimant and £1,101,871 to the defendant.157 However, companion to 
the award was a comprehensive dissenting opinion issued by one of 
the three tribunal members. This dissenting opinion became the 
backbone of an appeal lodged by the claimant. In its appeal, the 
claimant requested the remission of the award on the basis of “serious 
irregularity” under Section 68(2) of the English Arbitration Act of 
1996. Under English arbitration law, it is well established that the 
success of the challenges premised upon Section 68 are contingent 
upon the satisfaction of the highly designated threshold.158 Further, it 
155 Id. 
156 See F Ltd v. M Ltd [2009] EWHC (TCC) 275 (Eng.); see also Mosk & Ginsburg, 
supra note 24, at 280–81 (for another example where a dissenting opinion exposed serious 
flaws in the award and led to nonenforcement of an award on legitimate basis). 
157  Francesca Richmond, English Court Sets Aside an Award on the Basis of Serious 




158 See id.; Jonathan Sutcliffe & Lucy Greenwood, Dissenting Opinions in Arbitration 
Awards: More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 24 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 19 (2009), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57fe4d37c534a5c932910b78/t/5873aa5f59cc682e76
7a47d6/1483975263807/Dissenting+Opinions+in+Arbitration+Awards+More+Trouble+T
han+They+Are+Worth.pdf; Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (Respondents) v. 
Impregilo SpA and others (Appellants) [2005] UKHL 43 at ¶ 28 (Eng.), http://www.bailii. 
org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/43.html (“The policy in favour of party autonomy does not 
permit derogation from the provisions of section 68. A number of preliminary observations 
about section 68 are pertinent. First, unlike the position under the old law, intervention 
under section 68 is only permissible after an award has been made. Secondly, the 
requirement is a serious irregularity. It is a new concept in English arbitration law. Plainly 
a high threshold must be satisfied. Thirdly, it must be established that the irregularity 
caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant. This is designed to eliminate 
technical and unmeritorious challenges.”). 
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is required to show that any serious irregularity induced substantial 
injustice to the party raising serious irregularity allegations.159 
The claimant, using the dissenting opinion, succeeded in showing 
that the majority opinion caused substantial injustice emanating from 
serious irregularity and thus satisfied the high threshold set by Section 
68 of the Arbitration Act of 1996. Here, the dissenting opinion shed 
light upon grave error behind the majority’s award computation. In 
his judgment, Justice Coulson examined the dissenting opinion and 
concluded that “an important point . . . decided by the majority 
without reference to the parties [is] . . . a factor to which the court 
attach[es] weight in dealing with an application under section 68.”160 
At the cessation, according to Justice Coulson, “there was no pleaded 
basis for the tribunal’s finding that a certain sum should be offset 
against the amount awarded to the claimant,”161 and accordingly, 
there was a serious risk of a substantial injustice. Thus, Justice 
Coulson concluded “for the issue of the deduction only, namely the 
£973,344, to be remitted to the Arbitral Tribunal. . . .”162  
Clearly, the dissenting opinion, which Justice Coulson referenced 
numerous times in his judgment, exposed the tribunal’s error and 
helped avert a serious risk of substantial injustice. Evidenced from 
this case is the desirable and constructive role dissenting opinions 
play in the arbitral system.163 Notwithstanding this role, these 
opinions may also facilitate legal challenges. Thus, how a dissent is 
crafted is of utmost significance. Reflected by the success of this 
159 See Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (Respondents) v. Impregilo SpA 
and others (Appellants) [2005] UKHL 43 at ¶ 28 (Eng.), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/ 
UKHL/ 2005/43.html. 
160 F Ltd v. M Ltd [2009] EWHC (TCC) 275 [16], (Eng.). 
161 Sutcliffe & Greenwood, supra note 158. 
162 F Ltd v. M Ltd [2009] EWHC (TCC) 275 [61], (Eng.). 
163 To supplement, contrary to the argument that dissenting opinions inhibit 
enforcement and recognition of arbitral awards, dissenting opinions may actually remove 
the obstacles of award enforcement and recognition. In this respect, see Manuel Arroyo, 
Dealing with Dissenting Opinions in the Award: Some Options for the Tribunal, 26 ASA 
BULL. 437, 451 (2008) (“In a more recent case, the Supreme Court referred to a dissenting 
opinion to demonstrate that, contrary to the challenger’s allegations, a given witness 
statement had not been overlooked by the arbitral tribunal. Though the witness statement 
was not mentioned in the reasoning of the award, this could not justify the assumption that 
it had been ignored by the tribunal, the Court held. Moreover, the fact that the dissenting 
arbitrator mentioned the relevant witness statement in his dissenting opinion corroborated 
the view that the statement had not been overlooked, since a dissenting opinion should not 
contain any arguments which the dissenter did not previously bring into the deliberations 
with the other arbitrators.”) (emphasis added). 
2018] Without Silence, There is No Golden Rule; 259 
Without Dissent, There Is No Progress 
dissent, dissenting opinions must not be written for sole award 
obstruction, but rather drafted to disclose serious flaws and explain 
the reasoning behind the arbitrator’s conclusions. 
Consequently, dissenting opinions evince two sides of the same 
coin. Where one side allows dissatisfied parties to challenge the 
validity or enforcement of the arbitral award, the other side may also 
provide invaluable insight into an award’s inadequate legal reasoning. 
From this analysis, it is safe to say that the question of “whether 
dissenting opinions . . . jeopard[ize] the finality of the awards is, to a 
large extent, a moot issue.”164 Because dissenting opinions do not 
form a part of the award, they do not influence its outcome; although 
they may be taken into consideration by the reviewing court, they are 
usually merely regarded as the dissenting arbitrator’s commentary on 
the arbitral award.165 
e. Prolonging Arbitral Proceedings and Escalating Costs
The last major criticism against dissenting opinions revolves
around the prolongation of arbitral proceedings and, relatedly, arbitral 
cost inflation.166 Here, some commentators attend to the economics of 
dissenting opinions and contend that the preparation, circulation, and 
consideration of these opinions demand additional time, eventuating 
in the prolongation and cost escalation of arbitral proceedings.’  
Regardless of whether an award is unanimous or accompanied by 
dissent, every written opinion requires time to draft, circulate, and 
164 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 40 (citing Jacques Werner, Dissenting 
Opinions: Beyond Fears, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 23, 25–26). 
165 EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON 
INT’L COMMERCIAL ARB. 769 (1999) (“In action to set aside or resist enforcement of the 
award, a dissenting opinion, regardless of whether or not it was permitted by the 
arbitration rules or by the law of the seat, has no authority except as an element of fact. 
Thus, if the dissenting arbitrator states that a procedural breach was committed—for 
example, that a document was sent by one party to the arbitral tribunal but was not 
communicated to the other party—that is simply a fact which a court may take into 
consideration as evidence, but to which it is not obliged to attribute special importance. 
Both the dissenting arbitrator’s assessment of the facts of the case and the legal reasoning 
used have no particular authority. In this respect, the minority opinion will not affect the 
outcome of an action against the award made by the majority, especially where, as is 
usually the case, no review of the merits can take place in the context of that action.”) 
(emphasis added). 
166 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 277 (acknowledging that dissenting opinions 
“have the potential to raise the costs of arbitration.”); Stippl & Öhlberger, supra note 45, at 
390 (“Dissenting opinions will increase the time required to complete the proceedings and 
thus, may raise costs.”); Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 43 n.259. 
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deliberate. Hence, it is unfair to paint the practice of dissenting 
opinion as a hindrance. Although it would be irresponsible to argue 
that there are zero costs associated with dissent, what is equally 
imprudent is to slate dissenting opinions and cost escalation as 
shackled companions. In support of this statement, in the words of 
one commentator, “[O]ther than in the rare and exceptional case 
where a dissenting arbitrator out-pens the majority, dissenting 
opinions have historically been concise.”167 In this respect, the extra 
time and costs attributed to dissenting opinions appear to be 
negligible.168  
Therefore, rather than focus on the costs and time presumed to 
increase with the presence of a dissenting opinion, greater attention 
should be paid to the potential benefits harvested from these opinions. 
These benefits should not be sacrificed under the weak heading of 
additional time and cost. Instead, “the improvement in the quality of 
awards and the enhanced legitimacy of the process should be worth 
the additional marginal costs of dissents.”169 This point leads us to our 
next discussion: the advantages of dissenting opinions in international 
arbitration. 
2. Advantages of Dissenting Opinions
Made evident under the previous section, although some critics
portray the practice of rendering dissent as a rose garden filled with 
thorns (where thorns are in the majority), this section reflects the 
reality that roses are far more plentiful. The following section 
discusses seriatim three powerful advantages in favor of dissenting 
opinions: first, the usefulness of dissent in developing distinct 
solutions to arbitral issues and contributing to the development of 
law; second, assurance that awards are rendered with due diligence 
and care; and third, enhanced confidence in both the arbitral system 
and the award-making process. Through this discussion, this Article 
argues that dissenting opinions are not only integral to the arbitral 
process but are also integral to satisfy the dynamism of the law. 
167 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 43. 
168 Id. at 44. 
169 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 277. 
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a. Dissenting Opinions, Law’s Enhancement, and the Concept of
Stare Decisis
Regrettably, when discussing dissenting opinions in the context of
improving the law, much agnosticism exists. For instance, pursuant to 
Redfern, dissenting opinions in international commercial arbitration 
“do not serve to advance the development of law.”170 In consonance 
with Redfern, per van den Berg, “[t]he argument that dissenting 
opinions contribute to the development of law”171 is unfounded: 
With one curious exception, in none of the investment cases did the 
arbitrators refer to a dissent in a previous investment case. Although 
it cannot be supported empirically, one reason for such a lack of 
reference may be that tribunals know that dissents in investment 
arbitrations almost always emanate from the arbitrator appointed by 
the party that lost the case in whole or in part. In other words, 
regrettably, dissenting opinion by party-appointed arbitrators in 
investment arbitrations have become suspicious.172 
Additionally, van den Berg opines that “a party-appointed 
arbitrator does not have the expectation that his or her dissent will 
contribute to the development of investment law because . . . those 
dissents are virtually never relied upon in subsequent investment 
cases.”173 Clearly, taking these statements as a whole suggests that 
van den Berg correlates the role of dissenting opinions in law’s 
development with the quantum of references made by subsequent 
investment tribunals to these opinions issued in previous investment 
cases. From these references, he concludes that dissenting opinions do 
not fulfill a constructive role in law’s improvement. 
Notably, when van den Berg reached this conclusion, there was 
supposedly174 “one curious exception [Helnan International v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt,”175 where the arbitral tribunal referred to a 
170 Redfern, supra note 7, at 240. 
171 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 826. 
172 Id. at 826–27. 
173 Id. at 831. 
174 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 36 (“As a preliminary matter, we note that 
van den Berg is mistaken in his claim that ‘[w]ith one curious exception [Helnan 
International v. Egypt], in none of the investment cases [he surveyed] did the arbitrators 
refer to a dissent in a previous investment case.’ He overlooks the ICSID tribunal’s 
unanimous decision in Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru. . . . Van den Berg also 
overlooks the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdictional Award in Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic 
of Bolivia. . . .”). 
175 Van den Berg, supra note 11, at 826. 
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dissenting opinion issued in a previous investment case. However, 
“[i]n recent years there have been instances in which arbitral tribunals 
have favorably referred to dissenting opinions in other arbitrations for 
certain points of substance.”176 Hence, from a modern perspective, 
van den Berg’s statements pertaining to dissenting opinions and these 
opinions’ role in the development of law may be avowed obsolete.  
To illustrate van den Berg’s outdated argument, today there are 
numerous ICSID cases noting the increasing impact of dissenting 
opinions in investment arbitration. One example, where the ICSID 
tribunal expressly cited a dissenting opinion, is Señor Tza Yap Shum 
v. Republic of Peru.177 In its decision on jurisdiction and competence,
the tribunal expressly agreed with the treaty interpretation adopted by
Professor Weiler in his 2006 separate opinion rendered in Berschader
v. Russia Federation.178 In addition, in its final award dated July 7,
2011, the Tza Yap Shum tribunal cited and approved the partial
dissenting opinion rendered by Robert Volterra regarding the “fair
and equitable treatment” requirement in Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech
Republic.179
In yet another ICSID case, in Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of 
Bolivia, the tribunal corroborated its stance by referencing a 
dissenting opinion.180 In Aguas del Tunari, to bolster its decision 
regarding the respondent’s objections to jurisdiction, the tribunal 
embraced the reasoning of the Dissenting Declaration of Antonio 
Crivellaro in SGS v. Republic of the Philippines181 issued 
approximately two years earlier.182 Faced with Bolivia’s objections 
176 Kwast, supra note 141, at 132. 
177 Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 (Award Date 
July 7, 2011). 
178 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 36. Regarding the separate opinion 
rendered by Professor Todd Weiler, see Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. 
Russian Federation, Separate Opinion of Professor Todd Weiler, SCC Case No. 080/2004 
(Apr. 7, 2006). The part of Professor Weiler’s separate opinion to which the Tza Yap Shum 
tribunal referred is as follows: “While my colleagues concentrate much of their analysis on 
identifying the intent of the drafters of the Treaty as of the date of its execution, I focus on 
the treaty terms themselves as the best evidence of ascertaining such intent . . .” 
179 Señor Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, ¶70 n. 11 
(Award Date July 7, 2011) (citing Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, The Partial 
Dissenting Opinion of Robert Volterra, SCC Case No. 088/2004 (Apr. 12, 2007)). 
180 Aguas Del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., Decision on Respondent’s Objections 
to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Oct. 21, 2005). 
181 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil. Declaration 
(Dissenting Opinion of Antonio Crivellaro), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
182 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 36. 
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concerning the concession agreement and its preclusive effect over 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal identified the differences 
distinguishing Aguas del Tunari from SGS:183 “Despite these 
differences, the Tribunal also recognizes that its reasoning differs 
from that of the SGS tribunal. The Tribunal observes that its view is 
closer to that of paragraph 11 of the dissenting Declaration of 
Arbitrator Antonio Crivellaro in Société Générale de Surveillance v. 
Republic of Philippines.”184 
Next, other recent awards evidence the tribunal’s use of previously 
rendered dissenting opinions. In one such award, rendered in Blue 
Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela,185 the tribunal expressly concurred with paragraph 17 of 
the dissenting opinion of Sir Franklin Berman issued ten years earlier 
in Industria Nacional de Alimentos v. Peru.186 While assessing 
matters critical to establishing jurisdiction, the tribunal expressly 
referred to Sir Franklin Berman’s dissenting opinion and stated: 
 The Tribunal also concurs with the following statement by Sir 
Franklin Berman in the Industria Nacional de Alimentos et al v. 
Peru case: “[I]f particular facts are a critical element in the 
establishment of jurisdiction itself, so that the decision to accept or 
to deny jurisdiction disposes of them once and for all for this 
purpose, how can it be seriously claimed that those facts should be 
assumed rather than proved?”187  
183 Aguas del Tunari, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, at n.99. 
184 Id. As to paragraph 11 of the Dissenting Declaration of Arbitrator Antonio 
Crivellaro, see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at 
4, ¶ 11 (“Consequently, SGS’s claim seemed to me fully admissible before our Tribunal, 
without first being processed before the domestic courts as to quantum matters. If our 
jurisdiction derives from (also) Article X(2), as unanimously admitted, I see no reason 
why our Tribunal could not deal with and decide on the merits of the payment claim, 
including quantum, after proper examination of either party’s future arguments and 
defences.”). 
185 Blue Bank Int’l & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/20 (Award Date Apr. 26, 2017). 
186 Industria Nacional de Alimentos, A.S. and Indalsa Perú S.A. v. Republic of Peru, 
Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman in Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/4 (Sept. 5, 2007). 
187 Blue Bank Int’l & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/20 at 14, ¶ 72 (Award Date Apr. 26, 2017) (citing Industria Nacional de 
Alimentos, A.S. and Indalsa Perú S.A. v. Republic of Peru, Dissenting Opinion of Sir 
Franklin Berman in Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4 at 10, ¶ 17 (Sept. 
5, 2007)). 
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Another recent ICSID case where the tribunal referred to a 
dissenting opinion was İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Türkmenistan 
of 2016.188 The İçkale İnşaat tribunal briefly alluded to the dissenting 
opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab in Abaclat v. Argentine 
Republic and Daimler v. Argentine Republic,189 while distinguishing 
the Kiliç Ĭnşaat v. Turkmenistan case where Professor Abi-Saab’s 
dissenting opinion constituted the backbone of the majority 
decision.190 Here, although the İçkale İnşaat tribunal did not embrace 
the approach espoused by Professor Abi-Saab’s dissenting opinion, it 
discussed its merit while determining whether it would adopt a similar 
approach to the Kiliç Ĭnşaat majority, which found the domestic 
litigation requirement to be a condition precedent to the State parties’ 
endorsement to arbitration.191 
Important to note here is the obvious respect the tribunal paid in 
the Kiliç Ĭnşaat v. Turkmenistan case192 to the dissenting opinion of 
Professor Abi-Saab in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic,193 issued less 
than two years earlier. In its discussion on jurisdiction and 
admissibility, the Kiliç Ĭnşaat tribunal referred to the dissenting 
opinion of Professor Abi-Saab in the Abaclat case and stated: 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention explicitly recognizes that a 
Contracting state may impose conditions on its consent to 
arbitration under the ICSID Convention, in a manner that 
determines the conditions in which jurisdiction may be said to exist 
and be capable of being exercised . . . . This point was made with 
considerable force in the dissenting opinion of Professor Georges 
Abi-Saab in the Abaclat case, where he stated that the “legal 
recharacterization” of the majority was “conceptually wrong”: “It 
adopts an extremely narrow, in fact partial, concept of jurisdiction, 
limiting it to the ambit within which jurisdiction is exercised. But, 
as explained above . . . jurisdiction is first and foremost a power, 
the legal power to exercise the judicial or arbitral function. Any 
limits to this power, whether inherent or consensual, i.e. stipulated 
in the jurisdictional title (consent within certain limits, or subject to 
188 İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkm., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24 (Award Date 
Mar. 8, 2016). 
189 Id. at ¶ 243. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Kiliç Inşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anomim Şirketi v. Turkm., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/1 (Award Date July 2, 2013). 
193 Abaclat v. Arg. Republic, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
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reservations or conditions relating to the powers of the organ) are 
jurisdictional by essence.”194  
By referencing earlier dissenting opinions, these cited awards 
illustrate the increasing acknowledgment and use of dissenting 
opinions and herald the possible contributions of such opinions 
toward the development of law. Hence, the next logical question is 
whether and how dissenting opinions contribute to the development 
of law.195  
In parallel with all aspects of dissenting opinions, the answer is not 
straightforward, and varies based upon which forum the practice of 
dissenting opinion is discussed. Regarding international commercial 
arbitration, dissenting opinions may not present a constructive 
influence due to a highly regarded and strictly applied confidentiality 
principle. Because the confidentiality principle impedes publication of 
awards and dissenting opinions, the impacts generated by the awards 
and dissenting opinions are limited to the particular dispute and the 
specific parties.196 
194 Kiliç Inşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anomim Şirketi v. Turkm., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/1 at 70–71, ¶ 6.3.4 (Award Date July 2, 2013) (citing Abaclat v. Arg. 
Republic, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Georges Abi-Saab, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 
¶ 126 (Oct. 28, 2011) (emphasis added)). For other citations where the tribunals referenced 
dissenting opinions issued in earlier cases, see Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of 
Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-17, at 93 n.155 (Award Date Mar. 24, 2016); 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., Decision on Jurisdiction, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, at 57, ¶ 181 (Feb. 12, 2010) (citing SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil. Declaration (Dissenting Opinion of Antonio 
Crivellaro), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at n.176, at 2, ¶ 4), (Jan. 29, 2004)). 
195 Van den Berg, supra note 8, at 388 (“The Nightingale article [The Death of Two-
Headed Nightingale by Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg] heralds the four 
separate opinions as ‘a validation of the potential contributions that can be made by such 
opinions.’ Note the qualifier ‘potential.’ The Nightingale article does not inform us what 
the contributions of those four dissents could have been.”). 
196 Alan Redfern, Dangerous Dissents, 71 ARB. 200, 210 (2005) (“It is true, as stated 
earlier in this article, that a dissenting opinion may point the way to a change in the law. 
As was said in somewhat poetic terms, it may constitute ‘an appeal to the brooding spirit 
of the law, to the intelligence of a future day.’ But for this to happen, the dissent would 
need to be on some point of legal principle; and in addition, the dissent would need to be 
published as part of an award that was itself made public.”); see also Mosk & Ginsburg, 
supra note 24, at 267–68 (In this article, the authors embraced a favorable approach to the 
issuance of dissenting opinions and postulated that such opinions have a potential to affect 
decisions in the future. They, however, also added: “While this rationale for dissents 
makes sense in the context of arbitration between states, it is more problematic in the 
context of international commercial arbitration, which is, after all, a mainly private system 
of dispute resolution, although it is governed by statutes and treaties and often relies on 
public courts to enforce arbitration agreement and awards. The private qualities of 
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On the other hand, within the ambit of investment arbitration, 
every decision made by an investment treaty tribunal has a ripple 
effect that transcends the particular dispute and involved players.197 
The key factor generating this effect in investment arbitration is the 
transparency-oriented policy, which, unlike in international 
commercial arbitration, does not prevent publication of decisions and 
opinions. Thus, not only does this available knowledge create a 
perfect environment for valuable and substantive ideas to spread, but 
it also gives rise to “the de facto system of precedent”198 and further 
aids in its evolution.199  
Indisputably, arbitrators are not bound by precedent. However, as 
shown by the ICSID cases, ICSID tribunals frequently refer to and 
cite former arbitral awards and dissenting opinions.200 In this context, 
arbitration, especially the principle of confidentiality, are usually thought to weigh against 
publication of awards and dissenting opinions.”). 
197 Laurence Shore & Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Dissents, Concurrences and a 
Necessary Divide Between Investment and Commercial Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(Dec. 1, 2008), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1027691/dissents-concurrences-
and-a-necessary-divide-between-investment-and-commercial-arbitration. 
198 Id. (emphasis added). Regarding stare decisis in international arbitration, see Mosk 
& Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 268 (“Arbitration, of course, has no system of stare decisis 
or precedent. Arbitrators are not bound to consider the decisions of earlier tribunals or 
panels.”); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward A Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV., 1895, 1908 (2010) (“ICSID was not consciously designed to create a 
body of investment law precedent. There is no doctrine of stare decisis in investment or 
any other kind of arbitration. Yet despite the formally nonbinding nature of past awards, 
ICSID tribunals frequently cite to engage with awards issued by investment or other 
international tribunals. In analysis of ICSID awards issued between 1990 and 2006, Jeffery 
Commissions found that tribunals cited to awards rendered by other ICSID panels nearly 
80 percent of the time.”); Breeze, supra note 12, at 407 (“Although ICSID, like other 
arbitration fora, was not designed to create a body of precedent, and there is no doctrine of 
stare decisis in arbitral theory, it has been noted that ICSID decisions frequently cite to and 
engage with previous ICSID awards, and the awards generated by other arbitration 
tribunals.”). 
199 For further information regarding the direct affiliation between arbitral precedent 
and award publication, see Weidemaier, supra note 198, at 1895–958. 
200 See sources cited supra note 198. Notwithstanding the highly regarded privacy and 
absolute lack of transparency, commercial arbitral tribunals also pay regard to the awards 
of earlier tribunals. In this regard, see BORN, supra note 1, at 3823–24 (“A review of 
reported awards indicates fairly strongly that it is inaccurate to conclude that arbitral 
precedents are confined to sports, domain name and investment arbitrations (although it is 
correct that arbitral awards in these fields also have precedential authority). Rather, arbitral 
tribunals in a range of other settings have expressly noted that they are influenced by prior 
awards. For example, in one ICC award, the tribunal concluded that a prior award did not 
formally have res judicata effect, but that parts of the previous award represented an 
‘authoritative ruling’ on ‘certain matters that may be relevant’ in the subsequent 
arbitration. In another ICC arbitration, the tribunal similarly concluded that, although a 
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dissenting opinions are deemed persuasive authority and, accordingly, 
are significant and authoritative players contributing to law’s 
continued development.  
For dissenting opinions to have such influence over legal 
development, they must address shortcomings found in an award and 
propound views that palliate the side effects of these deficiencies. 
Further, considering that every award rendered by an arbitral tribunal 
establishes a possible referable framework for future proceedings, 
exposés made by dissenting opinions become more valuable and 
contributive. In this respect, several arbitrators made particular 
reference in their dissenting opinions to future repercussions resulting 
from the rendered award’s result and the persuasive authority set by 
it.201 For example, in his dissenting opinion, Sir Franklin Berman 
stated, “Because, however, I take a sterner view than they do of the 
manifold shortcomings of the Tribunal’s Award, I should explain why 
I do so, in the interests of the ICSID system as a whole, and as a 
pointer for future Tribunals.”202 
Like Berman, Arbitrator Keith Highet also issued a dissenting 
opinion where he noted the award’s shortcomings and strove to 
alleviate the mistake made by the tribunal. Specifically, he stated: 
I consider it important to append this opinion of my dissenting 
views, not to denigrate or undermine the reasoning and logic of the 
Award, but only to point out the key differences between my views 
and those of the majority. The precedential significance of this 
Award for future proceedings under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) cannot be underestimated. In addition, the 
Award will be an important guidance to future potential NAFTA 
claimants. It is for this purpose that as complete an understanding as 
possible be expressed of the legal issues involved.203 
prior award did not have formal res judicata effect (because the prior dispute involved 
different parties and different contracts), the prior award would be considered 
persuasive. . . .”). 
201 Breeze, supra note 12, at 406. 
202 Industria Nacional de Alimentos, A.S. and Indalsa Perú S.A. v. Republic of Peru, 
Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman in Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/4 at ¶ 1 (Sept. 5, 2007). 
203 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mex. States, Dissenting Opinion of Keith 
Highet, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, at 241 (May 8, 2000); see also Marvin Roy 
Feldman Karpa v. United Mex. States, Dissenting Opinion of Jorge Covarrubias Bravo, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, at 16 (Dec. 3, 2002) (“If the approach taken in this award 
were to prevail, it would suffice for any investor from a NAFTA State to show that another 
State party to the same Treaty has made only one mistake or miscalculation in the 
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Undeniably, in investment treaty arbitration, tribunals often 
proceed using the following steps: first, identify prior related 
decisions; second, compare the applicable facts coloring the prior 
holdings, and; third, apply those findings to the present case.204 In this 
environment, dissenting opinions fulfill a fundamental role by 
enlightening prospective tribunals to the deficiencies of preceding 
awards and encourage these tribunals to establish their awards based 
upon a firm legal foundation. By performing this role, these awards 
abate the relative wrongs inflicted by prior tribunals and thus 
contribute to the positive enhancement and evolution of law.205 
Unsurprisingly, it is not uncommon that the minority views 
memorialized in dissenting opinions are not always met with open 
arms by subsequent tribunals.206 Further, most dissents never mature 
into majority opinions. This fact, however, does not mean that these 
dissents avoid the circulation of ideas amongst tribunals. Noted 
administration of a tax, favoring a single national investor—whose circumstances are 
apparently similar—to claim and obtain a benefit from that State, to the detriment of its 
public finance.”). 
204 Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1031–32 (2007) (“[I]nvestment treaty arbitration tribunals tend 
to: (1) identify prior relevant decisions; (2) compare aggregate costs of departure from 
prior decisions with the aggregate consequences of following prior decisions, taking into 
account whether the policies underlying those prior decisions remain relevant under 
contemporary conditions; (3) decide which prior decisions to follow or depart from; and 
(4) articulate reasons for their decision.”); Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangl.,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/07, at 20, ¶ 67 (2007) (“The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous
decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier
decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also
believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the
actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States
and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.”).
205 For example, the dissenting opinion issued by Professor Georges Abi-Saab in 
Abaclat v. Arg. Republic was expressly embraced by the majority award rendered in Kiliç 
Ĭnşaat v. Turkm. 
206 William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435–36 
(1986) (“A dissent challenges the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority and 
establishes a benchmark against which the majority’s reasoning can continue to be 
evaluated, and perhaps, in time, superseded. This supersession may take only three years, 
as it did when the [Supreme] Court overruled Gobitis in Barnette; it may take twenty 
years, as it did when the [Supreme] Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart in Darby; it 
may take sixty years as it did when we overruled Plessy in Brown. The time periods in 
which dissents ripen into majority opinions depend on societal developments and the 
foresight of individual justices, and thus vary.”) (emphasis added). 
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earlier, in “the de facto system of precedent,” there are more 
investment arbitration cases where tribunals cite to and engage with 
awards and former dissenting opinions. Further, because dissenting 
arbitrators specifically refer to the rendered award’s shortcomings and 
potential repercussions stemming from the award, dissenting 
opinions, even if not referenced in a majority opinion, maintain a role 
in advancing law’s development. 
Viewed through this prism, dissenting opinions instigate a fresh 
approach and birth distinct solutions.207 Hence, dissenting opinions, 
by injecting different views, approaches, and methods of analysis into 
the award-making process, not only prevent static and stale law from 
becoming the norm in arbitration but also through dynamism 
rejuvenate majority opinions and provide a fluid foundation 
compatible with constant change.208 
b. Improving Award Quality
By identifying flaws in the majority’s reasoning, dissenting
opinions ensure that the majority diligently exercises due care and 
attention to all party arguments and issues.209 In consonance with this 
statement, albeit from a judicial perspective, Justice Brennan of the 
United States Supreme Court stated that “dissent . . . safeguards the 
integrity of the judicial decision-making process by keeping the 
majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its 
decision.”210  
Importantly, observing the possibility that a rendered dissent may 
influence the actions of the majority toward being more attentive and 
thorough does not presume that the majority would act otherwise in 
the absence of dissenting opinions. Regardless of whether dissent is 
drafted or not, every arbitral tribunal must adhere to the duty to render 
an enforceable and recognizable award established upon cogent 
reasoning, addressing all arguments and subtle issues. Unfortunately, 
207 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 37 (citing Hans Smit, Dissenting Opinions 
in Arbitration, 15 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 37, 38 (2004)). 
208 Shore & Figueroa, supra note 197 (“[I]f there is an emerging ‘common law of 
investment protection, with a substantially shared understanding of its general tenets,’ one 
would expect to see concurrences and dissents influencing these general tenets. And their 
influence would not be limited to the establishment of the content of legal standards, but 
extend to the application of such standards both to recurring fact patterns and to 
evidentiary records that may contain subtle but significant differences.”). 
209 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 270. 
210 Brennan, supra note 206, at 430. 
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although this duty is critical to the arbitral system’s functioning, a 
tribunal does not always dictate a perfectly analyzed award. However, 
tribunals faced with the “threat” of a dissenting opinion likely to 
emphasize the majority’s erred reasoning may practice greater caution 
and proceed with the utmost due diligence during the entire award-
making process.211 Moreover, should the minority arbitrator’s 
arguments not be sufficiently addressed by the majority, nor properly 
explained in the award, the issuance of a dissenting opinion may 
prompt the majority to further deliberate the concerns and arguments 
of the minority arbitrator.212 
In addition to ensuring the majority’s due diligence, the prospects 
of a possible dissent compel the majority to set forth a more eclectic 
and thorough reasoning. Because the dissenting arbitrator criticizes 
the majority’s analysis, perhaps weakening the award’s authority, the 
majority will naturally want to refute the dissent’s assertions and 
deliver a comprehensive opinion that not only justifies the desertion 
of other outcomes but also stimulates the award’s enforceability. 
Further, if the majority’s reasoning fails to incorporate all the 
deliberated information, the dissenting opinion may fill these holes 
and realize a pivotal role in the competent court’s decision to enforce 
the award. 
Reflecting this precise scenario is a decision rendered by the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal in X. Society, Y. Society v. Company.213 Here, the 
appellants challenged an award rendered by the arbitral tribunal214 
situated in Zurich on the grounds of infringement of the right to be 
heard.215 Specifically, the appellants claimed that the majority 
intentionally overlooked a witness statement. The Federal Tribunal 
dismissed the claim on the basis of lack of reference to certain 
evidence and stated that nothing in the rendered award inferred that 
the arbitral tribunal overlooked the evidence.216 To substantiate the 
dismissal of the appellants’ claim, the court referred to Dr. 
Pagenberg’s dissenting opinion, where he mentioned the allegedly 
disregarded witness statement. Due to this obvious reference, albeit in 
211 Rees & Rohn, supra note 10, at 335. 
212 Id. at 336. 
213 X. Society, Y. Society v. Company, 1st Civil Chamber of the Federal Supreme 
Court of Switzerland, 4P.74/2006, 24(4) ASA Bulletin 761–78 (2006). 
214 The arbitral tribunal was composed of Dr. Laurent Lévy (Chair), Robert S. Rifkin, 
and Dr. Jochen Pagenberg. 
215 X. Society, Y Society, supra note 213, at 765. 
216 Id. at 769. 
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the dissent, the court deduced that the tribunal did deliberate the 
witness statement prior to issuing the award.217 Here, because the 
dissenting opinion clearly filled the holes and palliated the 
shortcomings of the award, it illustrated the quality and 
comprehensiveness of the arbitral deliberations and facilitated award 
enforcement.  
Notably, to fulfill this role of ensuring and enhancing award 
quality, dissenting opinions must be circulated among the majority 
prior to finalizing and issuing the final award. Issuance of dissent 
after the award is finalized detracts from the efficacy of these 
opinions and proves unhelpful in assisting the majority tackle all the 
best possible arguments.218 The reasoning behind this point is clear 
because a late dissent will not be shared with the majority prior to 
award conclusion and thus will not provide the majority with the 
opportunity to rebut criticisms. Similarly, the majority will not be able 
to adjust the award in accord with the analysis and conclusions 
adopted by the dissenting arbitrator.219 Therefore, ideally all tribunal 
members should have an opportunity to analyze the dissent before 
finalizing an award and memorializing their reasoning. 
In sum, a well-reasoned dissenting opinion opens the door to 
vigorous debate and “improves the final product by forcing the 
prevailing side to deal with the hardest questions urged by the losing 
side.”220 However, for this essential role to effectuate change, it is 
imperative that dissenting arbitrators circulate their opinions prior to 
award finalization and issuance. In the words of Messrs. Mosk and 
Ginsburg, “[W]hen it is not possible to circulate drafts in advance of 
the majority award, it is basic courtesy that dissenters should at least 
circulate their opinions before issuance. . . .”221 
c. Increasing Confidence in the Arbitral Process
Unsurprisingly, one principle factor of a functional and effective
dispute resolution system is a party’s right to be heard.222 This right 
217 Id. 
218 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 271. 
219 Id. (“Indeed, in some cases, arbitrators have complained that they first saw 
arguments in dissents filed long after the award and cannot defend their position against 
criticism of the award.”). 
220 Brennan, supra note 206, at 430. 
221 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 271. 
222 See id. at 272; Stippl & Öhlberger, supra note 45, at 387. 
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demands that arbitral tribunals examine and address all issues 
germane to the dispute.223 This duty is contravened when 
“inadvertently or by misunderstanding, the arbitral tribunal does not 
take into account some statements of facts, arguments, evidence and 
offers of evidence submitted by one of the parties and important to the 
decision to be issued.”224 In this regard, dissenting opinions may 
fulfill a lodestar role by casting light upon a tribunal’s failure to 
appropriately tackle pertinent questions and arguments. 
A well-reasoned dissent not only reveals to the aggrieved party that 
the tribunal debated alternative arguments raised in favor of said 
party, but further proves that the tribunal did not overlook relevant 
statements of facts and evidence. By fulfilling this role, dissenting 
opinions evoke greater confidence in the arbitral proceedings225 and 
bolster award enforcement.226  
Along with quelling grievances of dissatisfied parties by 
evidencing deliberation into all arguments, dissenting opinions further 
“prevent a ‘run-away jury’ and avoid a miscarriage of justice ‘in the 
arbitral system as well as in the State court system.’”227 Thus, 
dissenting opinions, through this “whistle blower" role, illustrates the 
award’s deliberation quality, which in turn augments the perception of 
arbitration as a legitimate and fair system. 
By virtue of the addressed functions, dissenting opinions play a 
pivotal role in amplifying confidence in the arbitral system and 
concomitantly increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance with 
an award. 
223 Susan Field, Swiss Federal Court Annuls Arbitration Award due to Violation of the 
Right to be Heard, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2013), http://arbitrationblog. 
kluwerarbitration.com/2013/10/07/swiss-federal-court-annuls-arbitration-award-due-to-
violation-of-the-right-to-be-heard/. 
224 Tribunal federal [TPF] [Federal Tribunal] Apr. 17, 2013, 4A_669/2101, X. Limited 
v. Y. Limited, http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/17%20avril%
202013%204A%20669%202012.pdf.
225 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 272. 
226 This fact is illustrated in the judgment rendered by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 
the X. Society case. Here, the court faced an arbitral award challenged on the basis of a 
violation of the right to be heard by the appellants. Thus, the court looked to the dissenting 
opinion to decide whether the arbitral tribunal overlooked the witness statement submitted 
by the appellants. From the language of the dissenting arbitrator, the court deduced that the 
witness statement was properly deliberated by the arbitrators prior to the issuance of the 
award and, consequently, dismissed the challenge. For further information regarding the 
case, see supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
227 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 41 (citing James H. Carter, Rights & 
Obligations of the Arbitrator, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 64 (1997)). 
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CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of Redfern and Hunter, dissenting opinions 
conflict with the very purpose of the arbitral system: to reach a 
conclusive decision.228 Consequently, per Redfern and Hunter, 
irrelevant is the wayward arbitrator; only a conclusive award will 
honor the parties’ contract and should therefore be respected.229 
Further, these scholars find dissenting opinions to threaten the 
efficacy of the arbitral process through menacing the validity and 
enforceability of the award.230 Per this view, a dissenting minority 
arbitrator should nonetheless acquiesce to the majority’s reasoning 
and resulting award simply for the sake of preserving the award’s 
conclusiveness and authority. 
In harmony with Redfern and Hunter, other commentators 
discourage the practice of dissent. These commentators opine that 
issuing dissenting opinions threatens the functionality and integrity of 
the arbitral system. Specifically, these critics argue that dissenting 
opinions violate the secrecy of deliberations, endanger the legitimacy 
of the arbitral process by accentuating the connection between parties 
and their appointed arbitrators, debilitate the majority opinion’s 
legitimacy, obstruct award enforcement and recognition, and prolong 
arbitral proceedings and escalate costs. 
Although these arguments raise legitimate concerns, also 
undeniable is that dissenting opinions, for better or for worse, are 
“here to stay.”231 Therefore, trying to suppress or prohibit dissent will 
not neutralize the alleged threats posed by these opinions. On the 
contrary, any such attempt will frustrate the beneficial role fulfilled 
by dissenting opinions232 and will boomerang upon the arbitral system 
by impeding further improvement and tainting its perceived 
legitimacy.  
Resultantly, the focus must shift from suppressing dissents toward 
guiding dissenting arbitrators to successfully express coherent and 
helpful opinions. In this respect, what could provide critics of dissent 
with peace of mind is an integration of ethical codes and 
internationally approved guidelines into the arbitral system. Such 
228 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 70, at 577. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Mosk & Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 284. 
232 For the advantages of the practice of dissenting opinion, see supra Part B(2). 
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suggested codes and guidelines, by regulating the practice of issuing 
dissenting opinions, will assuage the fears entertained by critics via 
expressly defining and dictating principles, such as due regard for 
deliberation secrecy, prohibiting attacks upon the majority’s 
reasoning (or the manner in which arbitration proceeds), disallowing a 
dissent to be drafted like a vacatur application, and requiring 
circulation of the dissent prior to award issuance.  
In conclusion, important to remember is arbitration’s 
heterogeneous nature. It is this blend of different rules and principles 
that so successfully addresses disputes between parties with diverse 
cultural, economic, legal, and linguistic backgrounds. Because of this 
diversity, opinions range among tribunal members and often result in 
different ideas. In this respect, the practice of dissent should not carry 
stigma, nor should it be deemed a piñata to be beaten when there is 
frustration with the independence and neutrality of arbitrators.233 
Instead, dissenting opinions must be viewed in the context of an 
arbitrator’s quasi-judicial role and be regarded as a reflection of 
freedom of expression, corollary to a tribunal’s obligation to furnish a 
well-reasoned, substantiated award. 
233 See van den Berg, supra note 11. 
